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ABSTRACT
Labor arbitrators do not have a common profes
sional background, either educationally or experientially.
This research examines differences in education, age, and
experience in terms of the effect on values and attitudes
of labor arbitrators.

A primary research project was

undertaken to test several specific hypotheses derived
from the following general statement.
The attitudes of professional labor
arbitrators toward certain cognitive
objects (things, people, ideas, etc.)
significantly related to occupational
roles are in part a function of their
education, age, and experience.
The data used to test the specific hypotheses
were gathered by sending 400 questionnaires
usable response)

(43 percent

to professional labor arbitrators.

Each

of the respondent arbitrators completed a semantic differ
ential test of eight industrial relations-oriented concepts.
The questionnaire included questions designed to gather
detailed information on education, age, and experience.
The data were analyzed for differences at the .05 level of
statistical significance through the analysis of variance
technique.
Three hypotheses were tested concerning education.
For this purpose the respondent arbitrators were classified
xii

according to academic degree:

Law, Economics, and Other.

The responses of lawyer-arbitrators and economistarbitrators were found to be different over a substan
tial portion of the semantic differential data.

It was

concluded that the attitudes of lawyer-arbitrators and
economist-arbitrators, as reflected by the semantic dif
ferential test, are different.
The responses of lawyer-arbitrators and "other"arbitrators were concluded to be not different.
The responses of economist-arbitrators and
"other”-arbitrators were found to be different over a
substantial portion of the semantic differential data.
It was concluded that the attitudes of these two groups,
as reflected by the semantic differential test, are
different.
The general conclusion concerning education is
that the different educational backgrounds of labor arbi
trators are responsible for the significant differences
in attitudes as reflected by the semantic differential test.
No relationship was found to exist between age
differences and the attitudes of the respondent arbitrators,
as reflected by the semantic differential test.
Eight hypotheses were tested concerning experi
ence, as divided into "direct arbitration" experience and
"non-arbitration" experience.
xiii

Three of the eight hypotheses

concerned direct arbitration experience as determined b y r
(1 ) years as a labor arbitrator,

(2 ) number of labor

arbitration decisions rendered, and (3) whether the arbi
trator considered himself as devoting full time or part
time to arbitration activities.

Each of the three hypoth

eses concerning direct labor-arbitration experience was
concluded to be not different.
The remaining five hypotheses were concerned
with "non-arbitration" experience as determined by,
(1 ) federal employment experience with an agency concerned
with the labor sector (NLRB, WLB, etc.),
experience with a firm,
ence,

(2) management

(3) labor union membership experi

(4) geographic residence, and (5) NAA membership.
Based on an analysis of federal employment

experience,

it was concluded that the attitudes of those

labor arbitrators with such experience were different from
those without federal employment experience.

The hypoth

esis was accepted.
An analysis of managerial experience concluded
that the attitudes of those labor arbitrators with such
experience were different from those without managerial
experience.

The hypothesis was accepted.

An analysis of laibor union membership experience,
geographic residence, and NAA membership yielded no dif
ferences in the attitudes of respondent arbitrators.
xiv

In summary, education was determined to influence
the attitudes of labor arbitrator is as reflected by the
semantic differential test.
ence on attitudes.

Age had no significant influ

Direct arbitration experience had no

significant influence on the attitudes of labor arbitra
tors, but non-arbitration experience did influence the
attitudes of labor arbitrators as reflected by the semantic
differential test.

xv

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
Statement of the Problem
Passage of the National Labor Relations Act in
1935 marked a break with a work system under which, tradi
tionally, management's obligations to its employees were
either self-assumed or imposed by the competitive labor
market.

Since that time national labor policy has supported

the concept of collective bargaining, which is the process
whereby management and union agree on the terms
hours, and working conditions)
perform their duties.

(wages,

under which workers shall

The union-management contract speci

fies terms of agreement and sets forth the reciprocal re
sponsibilities and obligations of each party.

Collective

bargaining has resulted in more stable labor relations and
an expansion of industrial peace for the United States
economy.
Under collective bargaining, employers and em
ployees jointly agree upon certain specified conditions of
employment which are incorporated in a collective bargain
ing contract.

Striking a bargain does not, however, exhaust

all possibilities for disagreement.

In fact, contract vio

lations, contract meaning, and contract application are
additional sources of future disputes.

In recognition of

these latent threats to harmonious relations the great
majority of labor contracts contain provisions for amicable
settlement of contract-relate.d disputes in the form of
grievance procedures.

Usually terminating the grievance

procedure is arbitration, which is the topic of concern to
this study.
Arbitration as Part of the Grievance Procedure
"The essence of a grievance is a charge that the
union-management contract has been violated."'*'

A specified

procedure for resolving such grievances is present in 99
percent of all major collective bargaining agreements in
the United States.

2

Arbitration of a grievance is the

final step of the grievance procedure which normally car
ries the unresolved dispute through successively higher
levels of union and management interaction in a series of
joint attempts to resolve the issue.
out of the following situations:
agreement,

Grievances may arise

(1 ) violations of the

(2) disagreement over facts,

of the agreement,

(3) interpretation

(4) application of the agreement, and

(5) differences of opinion as to the reasonableness or

■^Sumner H. Slichter, et. al. , The Impact of
Collective Bargaining on Management (Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institution, 1962) , p. 694.
2

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Major Collec
tive Bargaining Agreements:
Grievance Procedures, Bulletin
1425-1, p. 1.

fairness of various actions.

3

Inclusion of a provision

for voluntary arbitration in the agreement is recognition
of the potential for unresolved conflict which pervades
most forms of human organization.
Union contracts impose obligations on management
which do not exist in non-union employment, thus creating
the basis for formalized grievances.

Grievance disputes

are legitimitized by the union-management contract and are
dealt with through the formal arrangements provided by the
agreement in the form of grievance procedures.

A typical

grievance procedure for a large employer (1 , 0 0 0 or more
employees) involves four stages, with successive stages re
presenting higher authority levels of union and management
representatives.
illustrative.^

The following grievance procedure is
It is a four-stage process requiring move

ment of the dispute from plant floor level, to plant per
sonnel supervisory level, to plant management, to corporate
management, and finally to arbitration.
. . . All grievances will be settled in the
following manner:
First stage:
Between the employee and one
department shop steward and/or one grievance
committeeman, and the foreman or the depart
ment supervisor. . . .

■^Slichter, o£. ci t . , pp. 694-695.
4
The Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 1425-1,
o p . c i t ., p. 35.

Second stage:
Between members of the
grievance committee. . . and the personnel
supervisor. . . .
Third stage:
Between members of the
grievance committee. . . and the plant
manager or his authorized representative
or representatives. . . .
Fourth stage:
Between representatives
of the international union along with the
local grievance committee and officials of
the company. . . .
Arbitration
In the event the grievance shall not have
been settled satisfactorily, the matter may
be referred to arbitration. . . .
"In a broad sense the formal grievance procedures
found in various labor agreements are very similar," inas
much as there are always several steps involved— usually
". . . two lower steps and one or two higher steps followed
by arbitration."

5

However, since the grievance procedure

is part of a negotiated contract the freedom of the parties
allows them to agree to procedures which may vary widely
along the following lines:

(1 ) the degree of formality,

(2) the character of representation,

(3) the regulation of
g
grievance activity, and (4) special grievance procedures.
One important similarity is that 94 percent of the griev
ance procedures terminate in arbitration— the submission of
the dispute to a third party for final and binding decision

5 Slichter,

op. c i t ., pp. 721-722.

6 Slichter,

op. cit., p. 723.

This study is generally concerned with the arbitration pro
cess and more specifically with the third party neutral who
is called upon to render a decision— the labor arbitrator.
The Nature and Process of Grievance Arbitration
Grievance arbitration involves the submission of
unresolved contractually-related, labor-management disputes
arising during the term of the contract to a third party
for a final and binding decision.

Arbitration is presently

the final step of the grievance procedure in 94 percent of
the collective bargaining agreements covering 96 percent
of all union organized workers in the United States.

7

The

growth and acceptability of labor arbitration as a means of
resolving labor-management conflict is reflected in the
following statements.

"In 1944, 1949, and 1952.

. . arbi

tration provisions were found in 73, 83, and 89 percent of
O
the agreements, respectively."
The National War Labor
Board

(World War II) provided,

"A tremendous stimulus in

the use of grievance arbitration.

. . through its policy of

ordering the adoption of contract clauses providing for

7

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Major Collec
tive Bargaining Agreements: Arbitration Procedures,
Bulletin 1425-6, p. 5.
®Loc. cit.

arbitration of disputes over interpretation or application
g

of the agreement."

This policy undoubtedly precipitated

the almost unanimous inclusion of the arbitration clause
as the final step of the grievance procedure in labormanagement contracts throughout the United States today.
As one might suspect, there has been a similar
pattern of growth for labor arbitrator appointments by the
two principal appointing agencies,
and Conciliation Service

the Federal Mediation

(refer to Figure 1-1), and the

American Arbitration Association

(refer to Figure 1-2).

The FMCS reported a nearly 300 percent increase in requests
for appointments between 1964 and 1973, while the AAA re
ported a more than 200 percent increase in requests for
appointments for the same p e r i o d . ^

More recently, the

demand for arbitrator panels has been increasing about
20 percent per y e a r . ^

Thus, labor arbitration has become

widely accepted by management and labor as a viable means

9

Paul Prasow and Edward Peters, Arbitration and
Collective Bargaining: Conflict Resolution in Labor Rela
tions (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1970),
p. 8 .
■^FMCS and AAA data made available to this writer
reflected the following absolute increases:
1964
4,791
3,932

1973
13,626
8,380

FMCS
AAA

11FMCS Pamphlet, "25 Years of Service to Labor
and Management, 1947-1952" (Washington, D.C.), p. 6 .

7
FIGURE 1-1
Trends in FMCS Requests for Panels or Direct Appointments,
Appointments, and Awards
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Source:

'65
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Data made available by Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service— Nashville, Tennessee
Regional Office.

8
FIGURE 1-2
Trends in AAA Requests for Panels or
Direct Appointments and Awards
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*Drop in 1973 reflects 3,293 pending

Source:

Data made available by American Arbitration
Association— National Office in Washington, D.C.

of resolving contractually-related disputes.

Its contribu

tion toward promotion of industrial peace is limited only
by its ability to serve the parties efficiently and effec
tively.
The Labor Arbitrator
Who are the persons called upon by industry to
serve and how are they chosen?

It has been estimated that

". . . in the entire nation three hundred arbitrators at

12
most handle 90 percent of the cases.”

This estimate is

apparently supported by results of a recent survey con
ducted by Joseph S. Murphy, retiring Vice President of the
American Arbitration Association.

Mr. Murphy surveyed 571

arbitrators listed by AAA and found the following:
Labor arbitrators collected almost $23$
million in over 4,000 cases during 1972.
One hundred and twenty-five arbitrators
received more than $5,000 from cases.
Sixty arbitrators received more than
$ 1 0 , 0 0 0 from cases.
The usual charges are between $125 and
$20 0 per day.
Arbitrators charged an average 1.44 study
days for each hearing in 1972, about the

12

Prasow and Peters, 0 £. c i t ., p. 15; also see
Harold W. Davey, Contemporary Collective Bargaining (New
Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), p. 180.

10
same as in past years.
(This is in
addition to actual time spent hearing
13
the case which is typically 1 or 2 days.)
Further substantiating the apparent fact that a
relatively very few persons actually do most of the arbi
trating is the following statement by William J. Kilberg,
General Counsel of the FMCS.

"Approximately 25 percent of

the arbitrators on the FMCS roster are responsible for
75 percent of the cases assigned."

14

The main thrust of this study is to learn some
thing about the value systems of this seemingly small group
of professionals who influence, through their arbitration
awards, the basic structure and process of collective bar
gaining, and who share the responsibility for the effective
ness and future success of labor arbitration as an institu
tion.

A closer look at the individuals comprising this

group will bring into sharper focus the basic hypotheses
of this study.
Using a sample quite similar to that used in this
research, Brian L. King compiled the following information
on active labor arbitrators:

15

13

ment"

Bureau of National Affairs, "Bulletin to Manage
(Washington, D . C . , April 5, 1973), p. 7.

14William J. Kilberg, "The FMCS and Arbitration:
Problems and Prospects," Monthly L abor Review (April, 1971),
p. 40.
15

Brian L. King, "Some Aspects of the Active Labor
Arbitrator," Personnel Journal (February, 1971), pp. 115123.
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As a group, labor arbitrators are highly
educated men with a great deal of 'real
world' experience.
In 1969 the successful arbitrator was
57.9 years of age.
The typical arbitrator's primary experience
in labor relations derived from National
War Labor Board experience or with the Wage
Stabilization Board (Korean W a r ) .
Of those arbitrators under age 50, 85.7 per
cent were attorneys.
The vast majority of arbitrators are either
attorneys or educators (primarily in schools
of business and/or economics) and are about
evenly divided in number.
A careful analysis of the Bureau of National
Affairs Labor Arbitration Reports, Volumes 41-55, covering
the period September, 1963 through February, 1971, revealed
that over 71 percent of the arbitration cases published
during this period were decided by labor arbitrators who
were members of the National Academy of Arbitrators.

The

NAA is the only professional association for labor arbi
trators in the United States.

It appears that this member

ship is responsible for the bulk of the labor arbitration
work done.

The following is a statement of policy relative

to NAA membership:"^
Membership in the National Academy of
Arbitrators is conferred by vote of the
Board of Governors upon recommendation of
the Membership Committee of the Academy.
In considering applications for membership,

Directory

"^National Academy of Arbitrators, Membership
(1973-1974), p. 3.
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the Academy will apply the following
standards:
(1) The applicant should be
of good moral character, as demonstrated
by adherence to sound ethical standards
in professional activities.
(2A) The
applicant should have substantial and
current experience as an impartial arbi
trator of labor-management disputes, or
(2B) in the alternative the applicant
with limited but current experience in
arbitration should have attained general
recognition through scholarly publication
or other activities as an impartial author
ity on labor-management relations.
In
evaluating the applicant's experience, the
Academy will take into account his general
acceptability to the parties.
Certainly there are many persons in our society
who are highly qualified, according to the foregoing charac
teristics, and who would like to serve industry as impartial
labor arbitrators.

What then, are the determining qualifi

cations for entry to the labor arbitration field?

Actually,

there is but one indispensable qualification for becoming
an arbitrator— acceptance by the conflicting parties.

Such

acceptance is difficult to achieve, as suggested by the fol
lowing statement relative to the arbitrator selection pro
cedure. ^
They are checked upon, cross-referenced
and indexed by trade associations, union
research departments, law firms, individual
industrial relations directors and union
business agents.
There are even several
firms which make a specialty of providing

17

Donald B. Straus, "Labor Arbitration and Its
Critics," The Arbitration Journal, Vol. 20 (No. 4, 1965),
p. 197; also see Davey, op. cit~ P» 181.
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information about individual arbitrators
and their performance as reported by com
panies that have used them before— a sort
of private FBI whose dossiers are available
for a fee.
Opinions about their intelligence,
performance, character and adherence to evi
dence and contract terms are solicited from
many sources before they become the selection
of both parties, at least in any case of
significance to the parties.
There is little doubt that labor and management
prefer experienced arbitrators.

This attitude is at least

partially responsible for the shortage of new, acceptable
arbitration talent and has resulted in heavy workloads for
a few, causing lengthy delays in the rendering of awards.

18

The parties' attitudes are aptly expressed in the following
passage.

19
New blood, they say, give us new blood.
So
now and then, when we submit a panel of arbi
trators, we slip in the name of a promising
young man, a comer, and who are the ones we
hear from? You're so right.
Those who com
plain the most that we make up panels by
shuffling around the same little group of
people.
We tried to get a line on him,
they'll say, and he's indexed for a mere
handful of cases; he's still wet behind the
ears and I had to use up a valuable challenge
to knock him off.
What are you trying to do
to us?
The Labor Arbitrator's Decision Process
The actual arbitration process is quasi-judicial

in nature in that the arbitrator must listen to the case,

18
19

Kilberg, 0 £. c i t . , p. 40.
Prasow, o£. ci t ., p. 16.
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interpret pertinent contract provisions, and render a
definite decision.

The labor arbitrator, however, is

endowed by the parties which, he serves with a wide range
of latitude in interpreting the situation.

Supreme Court

Justice Douglas, in an opinion which greatly enhanced the
power and prestige of the arbitration process, contributed
the following observation.

20

The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because
of the parties' confidence in his knowledge
of the common law of the shop and their trust
in his personal judgment to bring to bear con
siderations which are not expressed in the
contract as criteria for judgment.
The par
ties expect that his judgment of a particular
grievance will reflect not only what the con
tract says but, insofar as the collective
bargaining agreement permits, such factors
as the effect upon productivity of a particu
lar result, its consequence to the morale of
the shop, his judgment whether tensions will
be heightened or diminished.
For the parties'
objective in using the arbitration process is
primarily to further their common goal of un
interrupted production under the agreement,
to make the agreement serve their specialized
needs.
The ablest judge cannot be expected
to bring the same experience and competence
to bear upon the determination of a grievance,
because he cannot be similarly informed.
However enlightened the foregoing opinion

(there are those

who question that characterization), the labor arbitrator's
flexibility in seeking and applying remedies is limited
by these criteria.
beyond

"His decision cannot contradict or go

(1 ) the written agreement,

20

(2 ) the record developed

United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), p. 582.

15
by the parties at the hearing, and (3) the submission agreement."

21

A model of the labor arbitrator's decision-making

process has been developed in light of the foregoing con
straints.
The decision model represented in Figure 1-3 is
necessarily an abstraction from the reality of the total
environmental milieu within which the labor arbitrator makes
his decision.

As is the case with any model, much has been

omitted from consideration.

That bit of reality which re

mains in the present model has been carefully selected to
suit the purposes of this researcher in delineating the
two sets of interacting factors of the decision-making
process:

the external factors and the internal factors.
FIGURE 1-3

External Factors

Internal Factors

The Contract
The Arbitrator's
Parties' Briefs
and Testimony

Values and
Attitudes

Submission
Agreement

The Decision-Making Model

21

Prasow, 0 £. cit., p. 17.

Decision

16
The external factors of the model are:

the

contract, the parties' briefs and testimony, and the sub
mission agreement.

These external factors comprise what

normally are held to be the "facts" of any labor arbitra
tion case.

Indeed, these are the factors which bear the

burden of representing the reality which exists in any
labor-management relationship.

The external factors re

ceive primary attention both in actual labor arbitration
proceedings and arbitration-related research.
ing statement mirrors the situation.

The follow-

22

The focus has been on identifying high
quality information and having it enter
the decision-making system in an unfil
tered manner. The legal requirements
are that the information be relevant and
material to the issues at hand and that
all parties have access to the same
information. (emphasis added)
There can be little doubt that the above statement is
aimed directly at the external factors of the decision
making model.

And yet,

. . . the values held by the arbitrator
subtley influence his selection and organi
zation of what he decides are 'relevant'
data, his emphasis of certain evidence and
de-emphasis of other, his acceptance of a
certain procedural method, his attitude
toward prior arbitration awards, and his 23
literal or broad reading of the contract.

22

Joseph P. Yaney, "Validating the Arbitration
Process," Personnel Journal, Vol. 51 (No. 3, March, 1972),
p. 181.
23

James A. Gross, "Value Judgments m the Deci
sions of Labor Arbitrators," Industrial and Labor Relations
Review, Vol. 21 (No. 1), p. 55.

The latter statement introduces the internal
factors of the decision-making model, the values and atti
tudes of professional labor arbitrators.

These are the

factors which contain the criteria governing the merit and
thrust given the external factors, and yet, these same
values and attitudes have been almost completely ignored
in the literature of labor arbitration.
The impact of personal values on the decision
making process is well-recognized in the management literO

A

ature.

March and Simon suggest that these internal

factors constitute a "frame of reference" which has been
defined as:

"A system of standards or values, usually

merely implicit, underlying and to some extent controlling
an action, or the expression of any attitude, belief, or
idea."

25

(emphasis added)

Further, Parsons has said:

26

^ S e e George W. England, "Personal Value Systems
of American Managers," Academy of Management Journal,
Vol. 10 (No. 1, March, 1967), pp. 53-68; William D. 'Guth
and Renato Tagiuri, "Personal Values and Corporate Strat
egy," Harvard Business Review (September-October, 1965),
pp. 123-132; and Robert C. Shirley, "The Influence of Per
sonal Values on Corporate Strategy," Current Concepts in
Management N o . 9^ (Louisiana State University, July, 1972).
25

H.
B. English and A. C. English, A Comprehen
sive Dictionary of Psychological and Psychoanalytical
Terms (New York:
Longmans, Green and Company, 1959) .
26
Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in
Modern Societies (Glencoe, Illinois:
The Free Press, 1960)
p. 173.

Beliefs and values are actualized, par
tially and imperfectly, in realistic
situations of social interaction and
the outcomes are always co-determined
by the values and the realistic exigen
cies.
In the context of the arbitrator's decision model, values
are the internal factors and Parson's "realistic exigen
cies" equate with the external factors of each case.
comes

Out

(decisions), then, are always "co-determined" by

interaction of decision-system components.

Research by

Harris and Gross suggests the validity of the previous
argument.
Harris offers the following observations based
on case data dating back to 1942.

On the fact that company

awards exceed the union's— "It may be, therefore, that a
feeling of primacy prevails in the minds of arbitrators."

27

On the fact that an increasing percentage difference in
awards for the company as union size diminishes— "This
suggests the thought that arbitrators give weight to the
relative bargaining strength of the parties.

..."

28

Harris further suggests that arbitrators are growing more
sympathetic to labor.

27

Philip Harris, "The Influence of Institutional
Factors on Arbitration Awards," Labor Law Journal (Novem
ber, 1969) , p. 718.
28

Harris, ibid., p. 719.

19
Gross offers the following observations based on
case data involving subcontracting and out-of-unit transfers of work.

29

Consciously or unconsciously, arbitrators
bring these ideas (values) about ethics,
man, law, private property, economics, and
so forth to their cases.
. , . the arbitrator's reasoning and deci
sions reflect dominant social values, in
particular, the priority of economic ef
ficiency.
This study attempts to raise to a conscious level
these submerged aspects of arbitral decision-making.
Need for Study of Labor Arbitrator's Values
An exhaustive search of the literature of labor
arbitration reveals very little effort in the behavioral
area and certainly no previous attempt to systematically
identify and analyze the values and the attitudes of pro
fessional labor arbitrators through the use of accepted
behavioral and statistical techniques.

The literature

does raise the question of the effect of values and atti
tudes on the decisions of labor arbitrators, as previously
noted.

However,

"Much of the research on the subject of

grievance arbitration has been done by economists and
lawyers," which is not surprising,

"...

since most of

the academicians who are knowledgeable in the field come

29

Gross, op. ci t ., p. 55.

from these disciplines."

30

The nature of such research

centers around institutional factors, the grievance arbi
tration process and related labor law, each relying pri
marily on the actual arbitration cases as reported by the
Bureau of National Affairs' Labor Arbitration Reports.

As

a result, these studies tend to rely on secondary informa
tion and reveal very little, if any, development of origOl
. . .
inal data.
In addition, this researcher initiated a
DATRIX (Direct Access to Reference Information:
Service)

A Zerox

search for citations of all doctoral dissertations

written during the period 1938-1970, through University
Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

The DATRIX search,

No. 930949, was ordered on March 2, 1973 and yielded a
total of 28 references.

A review of these references con

firmed the nature of arbitration research performed here
tofore, as described above.

No research directly or in

directly concerned the value systems of labor arbitrators,
which are the prime concerns of this study.
This research will not treat the specific ques
tion of the effect of values and attitudes on the decisions
of labor arbitrators, which we have recognized to be part
of the thrust of the literature.

30
O1

Instead, it will

Fleming, 0 £. c i t ., p. 206.

See for example, Paul Prasow, et. a l ., Arbitra
tion and Collective Bargaining (McGraw-Hill C o . , 1970) ,
The Selected Bibliography, pp. 396-412; also, Davey, o p .
cit., p. 167.

concentrate directly upon identification of values and
attitudes held by professional labor arbitrators and at
tempt to relate these values and attitudes to certain
experiential and demographic variables in the backgrounds
of labor arbitrators.

"Arbitrators, unlike judges, do not

have a common professional background, nor are they all
trained in the same system of thinking."

32

The rationale

for this study is that since labor arbitrators come from
diverse backgrounds their values and attitudes may be
equally diverse.

Consider, for example, the following

33
quotations.
The result (decision) might well vary
depending on whether the arbitrator was
a lawyer or an economist.
I feel that the result would vary from
arbitrator to arbitrator, depending pri
marily upon the particular arbitrator's
personal feeling regarding the scope of
the management prerogative. . . .
Much more depends on the background and
experience of the particular arbitrator.

. . .

Is there a difference in whether a professional
labor arbitrator is a lawyer-arbitrator or an economistarbitrator, or trained in some other discipline?

Is there

a difference in whether he has little or a great deal of
labor arbitration experience?

Is there a difference in

whether he lives in the South or in the North, East or West

32
33

Fleming, o£. ci t ., p. 79.
Fleming, 0 £. c i t ., p. 96.

Could it be that even with their wide diversity of back
grounds and experiences, professional labor arbitrators
actually have similar impressions of certain concepts re
lated to industrial relations?

These are the types of

questions which this research seeks to answer.
Statement of the Hypotheses
The following statement represents generally
the relationships with which this study is concerned.

The

specific hypotheses to be tested are derived from this gen
eral statement:
The attitudes of professional labor arbi
trators toward certain cognitive objects34
significantly related to occupational roles
are in part a function of their education,
age, and experience.
Hypothesis 1:

Lawyer-arbitrators have different atti
tudes about certain cognitive objects than
economist-arbitrators.

Hypothesis 2:

Lawyer-arbitrators have different attitudes
about certain cognitive objects than arbi
trators classified as "Other."

Hypothesis 3:

Economist-arbitrators have different atti
tudes about certain cognitive objectives

34

"Cognitive objects" are any concrete or ab
stract things perceived and "known" by individuals.
People
groups, the government, and education are examples of
cognitive objects.
Fred N. Kerlinger,- Foundations of
Behavioral Research (second edition, New York, N.Y.: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1973), p. 19.
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than arbitrators classified as "Other."
Hypothesis 4:

Younger arbitrators have different atti
tudes about certain cognitive objects
than older arbitrators.

Hypothesis 5:

More experienced arbitrators, in terms of
years, have different attitudes about cer
tain cognitive objects than less experienced
arbitrators.

Hypothesis 6 :

More experienced arbitrators,

in terms of

decisions, have different attitudes about
certain cognitive objects than less expe
rienced arbitrators.
Hypothesis 7:

Part-time arbitrators have different atti
tudes about certain cognitive objects than
full-time arbitrators.

Hypothesis 8 :

Arbitrators who have worked for a federal
labor agency have different attitudes about
certain cognitive objects than those who
have not been employed by a federal labor
agency.

Hypothesis 9:

Arbitrators, who have held management posi
tions in private firms have different atti
tudes about certain cognitive objects than
those without such management experience.

Hypothesis 10:

Arbitrators who have held union membership
have different attitudes about certain

cognitive objects than arbitrators without
union membership experience.
Hypothesis 11:

Arbitrators' .attitudes about certain cogni
tive objects are a function of their geo
graphic location.

Hypothesis 12:

Arbitrators who are members of the National
Academy of Arbitrators have different atti
tudes about certain cognitive objects than
non-members.
Purpose of this Research

This research is an extension of the literature
of labor arbitration into the area of values and attitudes
of professional labor arbitrators, an area of research not
previously broached.

It is essentially an attempt to

determine possible differences in the values and attitudes
of labor arbitrators, such differences being possibly
structured according to the independent variables of age,
education, and experience.

The design of this research is

expected to yield empirical information identifying certain
values and attitudes of labor arbitrators.
to yield valuable insights into those " . . .

It is expected
deep and ob

scure forces which guide a judge or an arbitrator to his
35

conclusion."
■ III
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These "forces" to which renowned arbitrator
/

Peter Seitz, Comment on "Value Judgments in the
Decisions of Labor Arbitrators," by James A. Gross, Indus
trial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 21 (No. 1), p. 55.

25
Mr. Peter Seitz refers are the internal factors of values
and attitudes contained in the labor arbitrator's decision
model.

According to Davoy,

their views.

"...

arbitrators differ in

. . and in their philosophical approaches to

the task of contract construction."

36

This research seeks partially to fill a gap pre
sently existing in the literature of labor arbitration.
According to Gross:

37

. . . little is known about arbitral

decision making.
Labor arbitration is a complex interaction
of values, fact, and power.
Comprehension
of this complex interaction requires a multi
disciplinary approach.
Studies of arbitrators are needed.
Analysis of arbitrators ought to include not
only surveys of their social and educational
backgrounds, professions, attitudes, and
opinions, but also in-depth biographies which
will aid in understanding their philosophies
and techniques.
The identification of value premises is just
the beginning.
What is needed also is a study
of the social causes and social effects of
these values.
In summary, the primary purpose of this empirically-based
research is to identify existing values and attitudes of
professional labor arbitrators and to determine whether
significant differences exist as they relate to variables

36
37

Davey, o£. c i t ., p. 168.
Gross, o£. c i t ., p. 72.
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associated with the backgrounds of professional labor
arbitrators.
Methods of Research
Essentially this study involves the accumulation
and analysis of primary data.

However, the hypotheses to

be tested were suggested following extensive examination
of secondary sources.

A discussion of research methods

follows.
Secondary Research
The hypotheses with which this study is concerned
were developed following a thorough and exhaustive search
of the literature of labor arbitration.

Reference to the

secondary research is included where it was pertinent for
background material, where it adds depth to the analysis of
the hypotheses, and where it may substantiate the analysis
of the hypotheses.
Primary Research
This study is primarily concerned with hypotheses
testing.

A rather sophisticated primary research project

was undertaken involving the following steps:
1.

Sample selection.

2.

Questionnaire design.

3.

Analysis of the data.

At this point the sample selection, questionnaire design,
and the methods of analysis will be explained.

Subsequent

27
chapters will cover analysis of the data and determination
of conclusions.
Sample and Response
The universe for this study was composed of two
sources.

First was the 1973-74 Membership Directory of

the National Academy of Arbitrators, containing 420 names
and addresses.

This directory was made available by

Mr. Alfred C. Dybeck, Secretary of the National Academy of
Arbitrators.

Second was the Bureau of National Affairs'

Labor Arbitration Reports, Volumes 41-55, containing re
ports of arbitration cases and a bibliographic listing of
all contributing labor arbitrators.
Based on the advice of practicing labor arbitra
tors, it was decided that the sample would consist of onehalf NAA members and one-half non-members.

As a result,

of the 400 labor arbitrators included in the sample, 200
were members of the National Academy of Arbitrators and
200 were not.

Figure 1-4 indicates the total mailout and

return by geographic region.
The questionnaire was placed in the mail on
February 28, 1974, and no return was included if it was
received after April 6 , 1974.

A follow-up letter (see

Appendix A) was mailed out on March 18, 1974.

Of the 400

forms mailed out 202, or 51 percent, were returned.

Fifty-

eight questionnaires were not usable for the following
reasons:
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1.

Incomplete answers

(4)

2.

Returned by Post Office as non
deliverable (43)

3.

Returned too late to be included
in the analysis (6 )

4.

Deceased

(5)

After reducing the sample size by those returned question
naires that were not deliverable, or addressed to deceased
persons, the usable net percentage return was 43 percent.'
Questionnaire
The design of the questionnaire

(see Appendix A)

was based on primary and secondary research, the advice of
professional labor arbitrators, a priori reasoning, and the
needs of the study.
The first part of the questionnaire utilizes the
semantic differential technique

38

which is a psychological

construct designed to measure empirically the connotative
meanings attached to particular concepts by individuals.
The second and concluding part of the questionnaire was
designed to collect objective background data.
The Pilot Test
A pilot test of the questionnaire was conducted
with the assistance of 20 professional labor arbitrators

38

The semantic differential is explained further
in Chapter II.
The standard source is Charles E. Osgood,
e t . al., The Measurement of Meaning (Urbana, Illinois:
University of Illinois Press, 1957).
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from the Southeastern region of the United States during
November and December of 1973.
Initial contact was established over the tele
phone and each arbitrator's cooperation was solicited.
Following the telephone conversation a copy of the question
naire was placed in the mail, provided the arbitrator was
agreeable.
As a result of the pilot test the initial 16 con
cepts and 16 scales were reduced to 8 concepts and 10 scales
for the final questionnaire.

Modifications were also made

to that part of the questionnaire designed to collect back
ground data as a result of the pilot test.
The complete questionnaire consisted of seven
pages.

Five pages were devoted to semantic differential

testing, including instructions and the gathering of back
ground data, and were arranged in booklet form.

Each

questionnaire was accompanied by a letter of transmittal
from the writer, an endorsement letter from Paul M. Hebert,
Dean of the Louisiana State University School of Law, who
is a prominent labor arbitrator and a member of the National
Academy of Arbitrators, and a self-addressed return enve
lope to be mailed under Business Reply Permit No. 4657.
Methods of Analysis
The data were subjected to the analysis of vari
ance statistical technique, as well as to such commonly
accepted statistical procedures as the "t" test and

regression and correlation analysis.

Other techniques

were used specifically to analyze the semantic differen
tial.

The data analysis was.performed on an IBM 7040 at

the L.S.U. Computer Research Center, under the direction
of Dr. Kenneth L. Koonce.
Limitations of the Study
Due to financial and time constraints, the mail
questionnaire method was used to collect empirical data.
There is no question of the impact of this procedure on the
number of responses.

However, the usual risk of a poor

response rate was at least partially mitigated by the fact
that the sample was composed of professional persons, and
the effect of the follow-up letter.
As with any primary research of this nature,
there exists the normal concern relative to randomness of
the sample.

Given the population and sample obtained, this

writer feels that the response was sufficiently random to
satisfy the necessary randomness assumption of sampling
theory.
Since no similar study exists, there are no secon
dary sources with which to compare findings.
There is no way practical, to specify all factors
influencing the values and attitudes of individuals.

It

seems certain, however, that the factors considered by this
study are among the most important.

Preview
The following chapter explains the research
methodology used in this study and describes construction
of the questionnaire, as well as the statistical methods
of analysis employed in data analysis.
In Chapter III attention is devoted to testing
the hypotheses concerned with Education.

This is followed

by analysis of the hypotheses concerned with Age in Chap-'
ter IV.

Chapter V is devoted to testing of hypotheses con

cerned with Experience and Geographic Location.

Chapter VI

contains the summary, conclusions, implications, and recom
mendations of the study.

CHAPTER II
RESEARCH DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES
One of the primary objectives of this empirical
study was to partially identify and analyze the values and
attitudes of labor arbitrators.

This chapter is concerned

with an explanation of the psychological "tool" used to
identify and measure the attitudes of arbitrators, the
semantic differential technique.^"

The statistical tech

niques used to test the hypotheses and analyze the semantic
differential will also be described in this chapter.
Construction and Operation of the Semantic Differential
Logic of the Semantic Differential
The semantic differential test is a psychological
construct designed to measure empirically the connotative
meanings attached to "cognitive objects"

2

in a series of bipolar adjectives scales.

by individuals
The logic of

this technique follows.

■^Charles E. Osgood, et. al., The Measurement of
Meaning (Urbana, Illinois:
The University of Illinois
Press, 1957)
o
Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral
Research (second edition, New York:
Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, Inc., 1973), p. 19.
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"We begin by postulating a 'semantic space', a
region of some unknown dimensionality and Euclidian in
character."

3

The semantic differential test defines a cog

nitive object as a point in this space.

Thus, the semantic

differential allows one to differentiate the connotative
meanings of concepts

(cognitive objects)

among two or more

individuals or groups of individuals by analyzing the rela
tive positions of various points in the semantic space.
For example, the semantic differential has been used suc
cessfully to measure the psychological differences between
labor and management groups.

4

An example will serve to il

lustrate how the differences may appear in semantic space.
Osgood has defined the dimensions of the semantic
space along three lines:

evaluative, potency, and activity.

For purposes of this study it was determined that the se
mantic space would be defined by using the two dimensions of
evaluative and potency.

The "activity" dimension did not

seem appropriate since the purpose of this study does not
involve the measurement of motion and action which the
activity dimension seeks to define.

The evaluative dimen

sion is judgmental and signifies whether a concept is
"good" or "bad."

The potency dimension signifies the in

tensity of "goodness" or "badness."

A two-dimensional

3
Osgood, 0 £. c it., p. 25.
^Carl H. Weaver, "The Quantification oftthe Frame
of Reference in Labor-Management Communication," Journal of
Applied Psychology, Vol. 42 (No. 1, February, 1958), pp. 1-9.
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scheme may be used to represent Osgood's "semantic space"
as follows.

5

. (me)

7

. (management)

6
5
4
. (labor)

3

Legend:

2

E=Evaluative scale
P=Potency scale

1

E
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

The specific concepts of "me," "labor," and
"management" have been placed in this space, assuming the
results of a semantic differential test were "labor" =
(2,3), 2 units of evaluative and 3 units of potency,
"management" = (5,6), and "me" = (6,7).

These ordered

pairs of numbers assigned to the concepts are "labels"
which represent "meanings."

The meaning of a concept comes

from its relation not only to the two dimensions, but also
from its relations to other concepts.

Thus, each concept

has both "absolute meaning" resulting from the assignment
of ordered numbers, and "relative meaning" indicated by
spatial proximity among concepts.

In the above example,

5
Adapted from Kerlinger, ££. c i t ., p. 568.
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the concepts "me" and "management" have similar meaning
which is different from the connotative meaning attached
to "labor."

Further, the concepts "me" and "management"

are perceived as "good" and "strong," while labor is low
on both "goodness" and "strength."
As mentioned earlier, the semantic differential
test has been used to measure the differences in meanings
of concepts between groups representing labor and manageg

ment.

Labor arbitrators serve these two parties by

rendering impartial decisions in dispute settlement.

The

literature is most convincing in suggesting that decisions
may vary depending on whether the arbitrator is an econo
mist or a lawyer, experienced or inexperienced.

It follows

that the semantic differential is an appropriate test and
may yield empirical insight concerning the suspected dif
ferences between different groups of labor arbitrators.
The selection of specific concepts indigenous to
the area of labor relations to be used in this study is
covered next.
Concept Selection
The first step in designing the semantic differen
tial test is the selection of concepts

(or other stimuli)

to be evaluated on a series of bipolar adjective scales.
Final determination of the concepts used in this study was

6Weaver, o£. cit., pp. 1-9.
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based on the nature of the research, the hypotheses to be
tested, and results of the pilot test mentioned in Chap
ter I.

In seeking differences the two general requirements

for the selection of concepts are:

(1) the concepts must

elicit varied responses from different individuals, other
wise they are useless for research purposes, and (2) the
concepts should cover to some extent the semantic space.

7

The selected concepts have been carefully chosen from the
current literature of Industrial Relations in order to meet
these two general requirements.

In addition, it is felt

that these specific concepts are often at the core of the
decision-making process.
The following eight concepts were selected for
use in the semantic differential test:
WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS
THE LABOR MOVEMENT

(L)

RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS

(R)

COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
UNION LEADERSHIP

(Private Sector)

(U)

ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
MANAGEMENT RIGHTS

(W)*

(E)
(M)

UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL DECISION
MAKING AREAS
(P)

7

Kerlinger, o£. cit., p. 570.

*Identification symbols for each concept.

(C)

38
To mitigate against the inherent danger of
reponse bias and to reduce possible effects of interde
pendency among concepts, the following safeguards were
taken.
page.

First, each concept was placed on an individual
Second, the concepts were arranged so that no two

concepts of the three categories
Chapter III) were back-to-back

(to be explained in

(with one exception).

Third, in order to gain uniformity, the comment,

"Please

mark the series of descriptive scales according to what
the following concept means to you," was placed at the
top of each page containing a concept.
With the selection and arrangement of concepts
completed, the next step was to determine the bipolar
adjective scales that were used to obtain responses to the
stimuli.
Scale Selection
The second step in the construction of the se
mantic differential test is the selection of appropriate
bipolar adjective scales which are used to rate the con
cepts.

The two main criteria for scale selection are:

(1 ) that the scales be relevant to the concepts used, and
(2) factor representativeness.

The.latter criterion con

cerns the rating of scales along the dimensions of evalua
tive and potency.

Osgood, £t. a l . , have determined through

factor analysis that certain scales are heavily loaded
along one or the other of the two dimensions.

Using

p

lists

provided by Osgood, several evaluative and potency

scales were chosen to be used in the pilot study.

Of the

16 scales used in the pilot study eight were chosen for
final questionnaire use.

Two additional potency scales

were substituted to make a total of 10 scales, five evalua
tive and five potency.
The following 10 bipolar adjective scales were
selected for use in the semantic differential test:
Evaluative —

good - bad
fair - unfair
valuable - worthless
important - unimportant
successful - unsuccessful

Potency

wide - narrow
rigid - flexible*
severe - lenient
strong - weak
rugged - delicate*

To eliminate response bias, the scales were ro
tated vertically and horizontally.

Thus, the evaluative

and potency scales were interspersed and the scale direc
tion (positive or negative) was rotated randomly.

The

final format for the semantic differential test appears
in Appendix A.
When all of the above steps had been accomplished
the semantic differential test portion of the questionnaire
was ready for mailing.

A set of instructions was developed

Q
Osgood, ££. ci t . , pp. 35-61.
♦Substitute scales not used in the pilot test.

indicating the use of the instrument.

(See Appendix A)

The responses by the arbitrators served to locate the concepts in the semantic space for purposes of statistical
comparisons and analysis.

A discussion of the statistical

techniques used in the analysis follows.
Methods of Analysis
Two primary tools of statistical analysis were
used to analyze the data yielded by the semantic differen
tial test:

analysis of variance and the "t" test.

Also,

correlation and regression analyses were used to assess
the magnitudes of relationships existing within the seman
tic differential data.
The Analysis of Variance
The analysis of variance methodology is general
in the sense that the differences of two or more groups
can be tested for statistical significance simultaneously.
This technique was used extensively in this study since
most of the independent variables involved three or more
classifications.
three groups:

For example, degree is categorized into

lawyers, economists, and "others."

The "t" Test
Where the analysis of variance indicated the
existence of statistically significant differences between
three or more groups,

it became necessary to use the "t"

test in order to isolate the particular significant
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difference.

In the case of the example above, does a dif

ference of interest exist between lawyers and economists,
lawyers and "others," or perhaps economists and "others?"
The "t" test answered this type of question.

"Probably the

most common use of the "t" test is to determine whether the
performance difference between two groups of subjects is
significant."

Thus, the "t" test was used in this study

to test hypotheses suggesting statistically significant
differences in the meanings of concepts between groups of
labor arbitrators classified according to age, education,
and experience.
The previous explanation of the "semantic space"
suggests that the position of any concept in this space
may be influenced by either dimension, evaluative or potency.
Therefore, where either dimension was found to be statis
tically significantly different between compared groups
the concept was judged as being statistically significantly
different.
Decision Criteria
It was decided that a level of significance of
.05 would be used throughout the study to determine whether
significant differences existed in the meaning of concepts
between groups.

In accordance with the preceeding section,

Q
James L. Bruning and B. L. Kintz, Computational
Handbook of Statistics (Glenview, Illinois:
Scott,
Poresman and Company, 1968), p. 9.
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the connotative meaning was judged to be significant where
either dimension differed between groups at the .05 level
of significance.

At the .05.level of significance it would

be expected that only five of 100 scales would differ due
to chance.
The Analysis of Concept Clusters
"If two concepts are close together in semantic .
space, they are alike in meaning for the individual or
group making the judgments.

Conversely, if they are sepa

rated in semantic space they differ in m e a n i n g . " ^

As a

measurement of linear distance between concepts, Osgood
offers the widely accepted "D" statistic normally used in
evaluating semantic differential data.

Calculation of the

"D" statistic will yield a measure of the distance between
concepts in the semantic space which serves as an indicator
of the relative meanings between concepts.

Unfortunately,

the "D" statistic in pure form ", . . is somewhat descrip
tive and impressionistic . 1,11

Therefore, this researcher

has resorted to correlation and regression analysis in
determining whether the distance between clusters of con
cepts are statistically significantly different.

Such

analysis is a statistical improvement upon the "D" statis
tic, for it determines whether the existing differences

1 0 Kerlinger,

0 £.

c i t ., p. 574.

■^Kerlinger, 0 £. c i t ., p. 576.

are significant.

Alternatively, the existence of differ

ences is known, but are they statistically significant?
The "D" statistic does not answer this question, but op
tional statistical analysis employed in this study does
answer the question and is reported with the testing of
hypotheses.

The Sample
In Chapter I it was established that a relatively
few labor arbitrators, perhaps 300 to 400 in the United
States, perform perhaps 75 to 90 percent of the arbitration
work.

It was also established that most of these labor

arbitrators are members of the National Academy of Arbi
trators.

It follows that the universe should be amply

represented by arbitrators who are members of the NAA.
Also known, as established in Chapter I, is that
entry to the field of labor arbitration is severely restric
ted by prevailing practices and attitudes of the parties
who subscribe to labor arbitration services.

The reluc

tance of labor and management to request the services of
inexperienced labor arbitrators suggests an investigation
of the alleged differences between inexperienced and expe
rienced arbitrators, NAA members and non-members, since
experience is the main criteria for NAA membership.

Hence,

it was decided that the final sample of labor arbitrators
should represent both NAA members and non-members.
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The sample was composed of 400 labor arbitrators,
and was equally divided between NAA members and non-members.
Those 200 NAA members chosen .for the sample were randomly
selected from the 1973-1974 Membership Directory of the NAA.
Those 200 non-NAA members of the sample were
selected primarily from the Bibliography contained in the
Bureau of National Affairs' Labor Arbitration Reports,
Volumes 51-55, covering the period September, 1968 through
February, 1971, which was the latest volume available.

In

order to secure the full 20 0 names and addresses of non
members, it was necessary to go back even further to
Volumes 41-50, covering the period September, 1963 through
August/ 1968.

As one might expect, there was a large number

of non-deliverable questionnaires among the non-members
selected from the BNA sources.
questionnaires,
BNA Reports.

Of the 43 non-deliverable

42 were non-NAA members selected from the

The reason that the questionnaires were not

delivered was that the addresses were no longer correct.
But, even with this problem, the total response of 152
questionnaires was about evenly distributed between NAA
members and non-members.

There were 75 NAA member respon

ses and 77 non-member responses.
The total response of 152 usable questionnaires
constituted 38 percent of the 400 questionnaires mailed
out.

The net usable percentage, after deleting those

questionnaires which were non-deliverable and those ad
dressed to deceased persons, was 43 percent.

The Data Gathering Technique
The data used to test the hypotheses of this
study were accumulated from the sample described above by
means of a questionnaire consisting of two parts.
Appendix A)

(See

The first part was a semantic differential

test designed to identify the connotative meanings of
certain labor relations-oriented concepts.

The second

part of the questionnaire consisted of several questions
designed to gather information relative to the labor arbi
trators ' backgrounds concerning age, education, and experi
ence.

The respondents were provided the option of request

ing a copy of the results of the study or remaining
completely anonymous.
The questionnaires, bearing first-class postage,
were put in the mail on February 27, 1974.
addressed envelope was included for return.

A stamped, selfA follow-up

letter requesting support of the 285 non-respondents was
placed in the mail on March 18, 1974.

(Undoubtedly, some

anonymous respondents were included in this second mailout. )
Each questionnaire was numbered and dated upon
return.

Only 1 percent (4) of the 400 questionnaires sent

out was returned non-usable due to incomplete information.
Forty-three were not deliverable by the Post Office.
were deceased and, therefore, non-deliverable.
returned too late to be included in the sample.

Five

Six were
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Once the data were gathered the stage was set
for testing the hypotheses as expressed in Chapter I.

CHAPTER III
RELATIONSHIP OF EDUCATION TO THE
SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL TEST
It has been suggested that the decisions of labor
arbitrators may vary depending upon their educational back
grounds, particularly whether the arbitrator is a lawyer .or
an economist.

When one considers the fact that the ranks

of labor arbitrators are about equally divided between
lawyers and economists, the question concerning the possible
influence of educational background on arbitral decisions
becomes even more fascinating.

Of course, there are labor

arbitrators who do not hold either a law degree or a degree
in economics.

This group has been labeled "other" for ana

lytical purposes and comprises 12.5 percent of the sample.
The purpose of this chapter is to test Hypotheses
1, 2, and 3 in an effort to determine the relationship(s),
if any, between the attitudes and values of labor arbitra
tors as measured by the semantic differential test and
their educational backgrounds.

Such analysis will have

implications as to the validity of the arbitral decision
making model developed in Chapter I.
The statistical techniques used to test all
hypotheses in this study were:
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analysis of variance,

"t" tests, and correlation and regression analysis.

Results

of the analysis of variance test for all factors are con
tained in Table 3-1.
The analysis of variance technique yielded com
parisons of the arbitrators' responses to the stimuli with
respect to the independent variable associated with each
hypothesis.

The relevant independent variable for Hypoth

eses 1, 2, and 3 was the type of educational degree held
by the respondent arbitrators.
Table 3-1 is a summary of the results of the
analysis of variance test, showing the significance of the
F-ratios for each of the eight concepts as a function of:
age, degree, experience

(Expy, in terms of years), time

(full-time or part-time), experience

(Expn, in terms of

total numbers of arbitration decisions rendered) , federal
(Fed) employment experience, management
experience, labor
residence

(Mang) employment

(Labor) union membership experience,

(Res, by region), and NAA membership.

Each of

the eight concepts was analyzed for statistically signifi
cant differences according to the five evaluative scales
and five potency scales.

According to Osgood, "If there

is a significant difference on any one dimension, the over
all test will be significant.

. . .

Table 3-1 will be

referred to throughout the discussion relative to testing

■^Charles E. Osgood, et. al. , The Measurement of
Meaning (Urbana, Illinois:
The University of Illinois
Press, 1957).

TABLE 3-1
Significance of F-ratios for Concepts (by E & P) as a Function of Age, Degree,
Experience (Years), Time, Experience (Decisions), Federal Employment,
Managerial Employment, Labor Experience, Residence, NAA Membership

Concept

Age

Degree

Expy

Time

Expn

Fed

Mang

Labor

Res

NAA

Wage and Price Controls

(E)
(P)

N.S.
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

N.S.
**

N.S.
N.S.

N.S
N.S

The Labor Movement

(E)
(P)

N.S.
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

N.S.
**

N.S.
N.S.

N.S.
*

N.S.
N.S.

App.
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

N.S
N.S

Right-to-Work Laws

(E)
(P)

N.S.
N.S.

*
**

N.S.
N.S.

*
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

**
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

N.S
N.S

Compulsory Arbitration

(E)
(P)

N.S.
N.S.

**
**

N.S.
*

N.S.
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

*
App.

N.S.
N.S.

N.S.
*

** ( N.S
N.S.
N.S

Union Leadership

(E)
(P)

N.S.
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

*
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

App.
N.S.

N.S
N.S

Economic Efficiency

(E)
(P)

N.S.
N.S.

*
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

**
**

N.S.
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

N.S
N.S

Management Rights

(E)
(P)

N.S.
N.S..

N.S.
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

*
N.S.

App.
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

**
N.S.

N.S
N.S

Union Penetration of
Mgt. Decision-Making

(E)
(P)

**
App.

N.S.
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

N.S.
N.S.

N.S
**

*
*

N.S. = Not Significant

(E) = Evaluative Scales

App. = Approaching Accepted Level of Significance = .10

(P) = Potency Scales

*Level of Significance = .05
**Level of Significance = .01

of all hypotheses.

The appendix contains the actual analy

sis of variance table for each dependent variable analyzed.
These tables contain the degrees of freedom, sum of squares,
mean squares, and F-ratios for each concept analyzed.

Sev

eral two-way interactions were performed with the concepts
grouped into the three classifications of labor-supportive,
management-supportive, and legal, resulting in the identi
fication of each classification as a separate cluster.

Each

statistical test was corrected for samples of unequal size.
Table 3-2 contains a Correlation Coefficient
Matrix for Concepts by Evaluative and Potency Scales indi
cating the correlation values and the level of significance
for each comparison.

It is particularly important to note

that the evaluative scales and the potency scales for each
concept are statistically significantly related.

This

signifies that the responses to the stimuli move in the
same direction on the evaluative scales and the potency
scales.

One may conclude, therefore, that there was no

confusion between the evaluative dimension and potency
dimension for any concept.

Thus, one may conclude, for

example, that a concept judged to be "important" was also
judged to be "strong," and conversely a concept judged to
be "unimportant" was also judged to be "weak."

The manner

in which the respondent arbitrators were classified accord
ing to education is discussed in the following section.

TABLE 3-2
Matrix of Correlation Coefficients for Concepts
by Evaluative and Potency Dimensions
WE
WE
WP

WP
**
.34

LE

LP

RE

.16

-.07

-.17

.08

LE

.08 -.09
**
.30 -.07

LP

.01

RE
RP
CE

RP
**
-.27

CE

CP

.10

-.07

-.08

-.00

-.08

.21

.12
*
.19

.07
**
.64

.11
**
.28
.12

.01
**
.33
**
.29
**
.60

UE
UP
EE
**
.23 - .08
.15
**
**
.30
.25 -.01
**
**
.58
.29
.01
**
**
.28
.30 -.02
.07
.02
**
.26

.17
.07
**
.29 -.13

UE

.09 -.03
**
.26 -.16
**
.40
.15

UP

-.11

CP

.24

EE
EP

MP
PE

**Level of Significance = .01

.09
.17
- .05
.06
.03
.01
- .02
- .14
.08
**
.25
**
.41

ME
**
.23
**
.24
**
.29
.00
**
.32
*
.20
**
.26
*
.19
**
.47
**
.23
**
.33
.16

ME

*Level of Significance = .05

EP

E = Evaluative Scales
P = Potency Scales

MP

PE

PP

.06
.17
**
.36 -.06

-.02

.10

.06

.03

.05

.11 -.02
**
.33
.01
**
.34
.03

.00

.11
.09
**
.30 -.11
**
.29 -.03
**
.36 -.10
.16 -.07
**
.29 -.02
**
*
.56 -.21
*
-.20

.01
.06
-.16
-.11
.03
-.01
-.07
.07
-.17
-.04
**
.41

52
Classification of Labor Arbitrators
The respondent arbitrators were classified by
university degree and distributed as follows:
Degree
Law
Economics
Other

Number

Percent

81
52
19

53.29
34.21
12.50

152

100.00%

The sample was comprised of highly educated individuals
involving, in some instances, persons with multiple profes
sional degrees.

In such cases, assignment to classification

depended on this researcher's judgment and the criteria
followed along these lines.

Where the arbitrator held both

a law degree and a degree in another field, it was assumed
that the arbitrator was engaged in the legal profession and
he

(or she) was classified as lawyer.
Where the arbitrator held a degree in Economics,

Business, or Labor Relations he (or she) was classified
as economist.

Again, the judgment of this researcher was

necessary and it was determined that a person educated in
Business or Labor Relations normally received a substantial
background in Economics, thus justifying his classification
as economist.

All university degrees other than Law, Eco

nomics, Business, or Labor Relations were classified
"other."
The composition of the group of arbitrator respondents classified as "other" is quite diverse, with
several educational areas being represented as follows:

Engineering

(8 ), Psychology

Liberal Arts

(2), Sociology (2), History

(2), Philosophy (1), Political Science

(2)

(1),

and Agriculture (1).
The Clustering of Concepts
Initial analysis of the data suggested the exist
ence of certain statistical relations among the eight con
cepts used in the study.

Referring to Table 3-2, one can

observe these significant correlations.

The two concepts

labeled THE LABOR MOVEMENT and UNION LEADERSHIP were cor
related at the .01 level of significance for both evalua
tive and potency scales.

Such a high degree of correlation

suggests that the assigned meanings of these particular
concepts are very similar.

The above concepts, along with

UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING AREAS, were
labeled and classified as "union-supportive" concepts for
purposes of further statistical analysis.
Reference to Table 3-2 permits one to observe
another set of highly correlated concepts, ECONOMIC EF
FICIENCY and MANAGEMENT RIGHTS.

The evaluative scales of

these two concepts also correlated at the .01 level of
significance.

These two concepts were labeled and classi

fied as "management-supportive" concepts for further
analytical purposes.
The three remaining concepts, WAGE AND PRICE
CONTROLS, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION, and RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS
were not so highly correlated as the two previous groupings
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The only relationship of importance was negative, but
statistically significant at the .01 level, and occurred
between the concepts RIGHT-TQ-WORK LAWS and WAGE AND PRICE
CONTROLS.

Based on this relationship and their obvious

obligatory connotations, the remaining three concepts were
labeled and classified as "legal" concepts.

In summary,

for purposes of analysis the eight concepts of the semantic
differential test were classified as follows:
Union-supportive
THE LABOR MOVEMENT
UNION LEADERSHIP
UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL DECISION
MAKING AREAS
Management-supportive
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
MANAGEMENT RIGHTS
Legal
WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS
Figure 3-1 was developed using the means of all
scales by type of concept.

It depicts in two-dimensional

semantic space the clustering of concepts as classified
above.

The actual mean scores by dimension are:
Type of Concept
Legal
Management-supportive
Union-supportive

Evaluative
3.84
5.40
5.15

Potency
3.77
4.25
4.07

It is evident that those concepts labeled "legal" received
generally negative responses, while "union-supportive" and
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"management-supportive" concepts were regarded more favor
ably, with the latter enjoying the more positive response.
Statistical analysis of the data by type of con
cept was then performed to determine what relationship(s),
if any, exists between educational degrees
and "other")
above.

(Law, Economics,

and responses by type of concept as classified

The results of the test for interaction are pre

sented with the testing of each appropriate hypothesis.
Statistical testing of the first hypothesis
follows.
FIGURE 3-1
Concept Clusters in Semantic Space
P
7
6
5
4
3
Legend:
2

L=Legal
U=Union
M=Management

1
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Analysis of the Semantic Differential
for Lawyer and Economist Arbitrators
The arbitral decision-making model developed in
Chapter I suggests that the personal values and attitudes
of professional labor arbitrators may influence arbitration
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decisions.

The following hypothesis was designed to test

the idea that the values and attitudes of lawyer-arbitrators
and economist-arbitrators may be dependent upon their educa
tional backgrounds and may differ as a result.

Testing of

this hypothesis should contribute toward resolution of the
issue.
Hypothesis 1:

Lawyer-arbitrators have dif
ferent attitudes about certain
cognitive objects than do
economist-arbitrators.

The multiple analysis of variance technique was
the first statistical test to which the semantic differen
tial data were subjected.

It yielded the information con

tained in Table 3-1, indicating significant differences in
arbitrator responses by degree for the following four con
cepts:

RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION, ECO

NOMIC EFFICIENCY, and UNION. PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL
DECISION-MAKING AREAS.
Figure 3-2 demonstrates graphically the relation
ships of the four concepts with significantly different
responses by degree, according to their evaluative dimen
sions.

One may observe that economists always adopted a

more extreme position, whether positive or negative, than
did lawyers or "others."

It appears that economists had

much stronger convictions about these four concepts than
did lawyers or "others."

Note also the definitive ranking

of the concepts, with RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS occupying the lower
level and the concepts COMPULSORY ARBITRATION and UNION

FIGURE 3-2
Means

(E Scales) by Degree for Concepts
of Statistical Significance

5.8
5.6
5.4
5.2
5.0
4.8
4.6
4.4
.2
.0
.8
.6
.4
.2
.0
.8
Law

Legend:

Economics

Others

E = Economic Efficiency
P = Union Penetration of Managerial
Decision-Making Areas
C = Compulsory Arbitration
Sector)
R = Right-to-Work Laws

(Private

PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING AREAS next in
ascending order.

The concept given the most credence and

occupying the highest level in the ranking is ECONOMIC
EFFICIENCY.

This particular finding seems to support the

observation by Gross that, " . . .

the arbitrator's reason

ing and decisions reflect dominant social values, in par-

2
ticular, the priority of economic efficiency."
added)

(emphasis

There seems to be little doubt that the semantic

differential test was successful in identifying the exist
ence of significant differences in the meanings attached
to the concepts by lawyer-arbitrators and economistarbitrators, as well as establishing priorities among con
cepts.

The next step was to isolate those concepts which

were significantly different for lawyer-arbitrators and
economist-arbitrators.

The "t" test was used to accomplish

this purpose and the total results of this test by degree
are presented in Table 3-3.
Test for Differences
As indicated in Table 3-3, the concepts which
showed significant differences between lawyer-arbitrators
and economist-arbitrators are:

RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS, COM

PULSORY ARBITRATION, and UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL
DECISION-MAKING AREAS.

The concept RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS

2
James A. Gross, "Value Judgments m the Deci
sions of Labor Arbitrators," Industrial and Labor Relations
Review, Vol. 21 (No. 1), p. 55.

TABLE 3-3
Means of Concepts and Significant Differences in
Connotative Meanings of Concepts by Degree

WE

WP

LE

LP

PP

4.30

PE
**
4.26
(1)

3.93

RE

RP

CE
**
4.78
(1)

CP
**
3.46
(1)

UE

UP

EE

EP

ME

MP

5.43

4.09

5.41

4.28

5.45

Law

3.94

3.84

5.90

4.24

3.43

*
3.34
(1)

Economics

3.99

3.90

5.78

4.02

**
2.96
(3)

2.98
(3)

*
3.37
(3)

**
2.85
(3)

5.29

3.82

*
5.64
(3)

4.33

5.10

4.07

4.71

4.22

Others

3.80

3.85

5.52

4.10

4.24

**
3.70
(2)

4.42

3.75

5.18

4.00

5.05

4.04

5.36

4.20

4.56

4.09

*Level of Significance = .05
**Level of Significance = .01
"t" Test Relationships of Significance:
(1) = Law and Economics
(2) = Law and Others
(3) = Economics and Others

in

vo
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has a "t" score of 3.34

(for potency scales) which was

significantly different at the .05 level.

COMPULSORY

ARBITRATION was significantly different at the .01 level
along both dimensions, evaluative and potency, with "t"
scores of 4.78 and 3.46, respectively.

The concept UNION

PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING AREAS had a "t"
score of 4.26

(for evaluative scales) which was signifi

cantly different at the .01 level.
The semantic profiles offered in Exhibits 3-1
through 3-8 illustrate the relationships of individual
responses to the bipolar adjective scales for economistarbitrators and lawyer-arbitrators.

The following observa

tions may be noted with a glance at the semantic profiles.
For the concept RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS, which was statisti
cally significantly different, economist-arbitrators held
a conclusively more negative viewpoint than the slightly
negative, sometimes neutral, position occupied by lawyer3
arbitrators.
The widest separation of viewpoints occurred with
the statistically significant concept of COMPULSORY ARBI
TRATION

(Private Sector), as seen in Exhibit 3-4.

Whereas

economist-arbitrators are decidedly opposed to the concept,

3
The bipolar adjectives of the semantic differen
tial are numerically scaled "1" through "7." The neutral
position is considered to be "4." Any value less than "4"
is considered to represent negative viewpoints.
Any value
greater than "4" is considered to represent positive view
points.
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EXHIBIT 3-1

"WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS"

Good
Bad
Strong
Weak
Successful
Unsuccessful
Fair
Unfair
Wide
Narrow
Important
Unimportant
Flexible
Rigid
Valuable
Worthless
Lenient
Severe

__
Delicate

Hugged

Legend: ------ Lawyers
Economists
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EXHIBIT 3-2

"THE LABOR MOVEMENT"

Good
Bad
Strong
Weak
Successful
Unsuccessful
Fair
Unfair
Wide
Narrow
Important
Unimportant
Flexible
Rigid
Valuable
Worthless
Lenient
Severe
Delicate
Rugged

Legend:------ Lawyers
------ Economists
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EXHIBIT 3-3

"RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS"

Good

Bad

Strong

Weak

Successful

Unsuccessful
Unfair

Fair

Narrow

Wide
Important

Unimportant
Rigid

Flexible

Worthless

Valuable

Severe

Lenient

Rugged

Delicate

Legend: ------Lawyers
-----

Economists
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EXHIBIT 3-4

"COMPULSORY ARBITRATION"
(Private Sector)
Bad
Weak
Unsuccessful
Unfair
Narrow
Unimportant
Rigid
Worthless
Severe
Rugged

Legend: ----- Lawyers
------ Economists

Good
Strong
Successful
Fair
Wide
Important
Flexible
Valuable
Lenient
Delicate

EXHIBIT 3-5

UNION LEADERSHIP"

Unsuccessful
Unfair .
Narrow .
Unimportant .
Rigid .

Important

Worthless .

Flexible

Severe .

valuable

Rugged .

Lenient
Delicate

Legend:

Lawyers
Economists
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EXHIBIT 3-6

"ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY"

Bad
Weak
Unsuccessful
Unfair
Narrow
Unimportant
Rigid
Worthless
Severe
Rugged

Legend: ------ Lawyers
------ Economists

Good
Strong
Successful
Fair
Wide
Important
Flexible
Valuable
Lenient
Delicate
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EXHIBIT 3-7

"MANAGEMENT RIGHTS"

Good

Bad

Strong

Weak

Successful

Unsuccessful
Unfair

Fair

Narrow

Wide
Important

Unimportant
Rigid

Flexible

Worthless

Valuable

Severe

Lenient

Rugged

Delicate

Legend: ------ Lawyers
-----

Economists
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EXHIBIT 3-8

"UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL
DECISION-MAKING AREAS"
Good

Bad

. Strong

Weak
Unsuccessful
Unfair

Fair

Narrow

^ Wide
Important

Unimportant
Rigid

Flexible

Worthless

j_ Valuable

Severe

Lenient

Rugged

. Delicate

Legend: -----

Lawyers
Economists

lawyer-arbitrators are generally supportive of the idea of
compulsory arbitration for the private sector, rating it as
rather fair, modestly valuable, and important.
The positions are reversed for the final two
concepts of statistical significance, with economistarbitrators expressing more positive viewpoints than the
lawyer-arbitrators.

The concept ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY,

illustrated in Exhibit 3-6, enjoys great favor and is wellsupported by both groups.

It is not surprising that econo

mists would express the more positive commitment since
economic efficiency is a cornerstone of economic theory.
The concept UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING
AREAS

(Exhibit 3-8) is viewed by lawyer-arbitrators as

rather neutral to negative, whereas economist-arbitrators
judge this concept as neutral to positive.
The next section will examine the relationship(s)
if any, between degree and the concepts as they appear in
clusters.
Test for Interactions
Having recognized the clusters existing among
the eight concepts and having classified them accordingly,
the next step is to determine what relationship(s), if any,
occurs between the concepts by type of cluster and degree.
The nature of the question becomes whether degree affects
response by type of concept.
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An analysis of variance was performed on the
data and the results are recorded below in Table 3-4.
TABLE 3-4
Analysis of Variance for D e g r e e , Type of Concept,
and Interactions

Source
Regression
Degree
Type
Degree * Type
Error

8
2
2

4
445

m. s

s. s

d.f

98.34
3.32
86.92
8.14
149.22

12.19
1.66

43.46
2.07
.33

F-ratio

36.67**
4.95**
129.60**
6.07**

**Level of Significance = .01
As indicated above, the degree held, Law, Eco
nomics, or other, was statistically significant at the .01
level.

(Analysis presented earlier in this chapter, of

course, arrived generally at the same results, showing
significant differences by degree for four of the eight
concepts.

Refer to Table 3-1.)
Attention at this point is turned to the results

contained in Table 3-4 concerning the concepts by type and
the interactions of degree and type of concept.

Type of

concept was found to be significant, at the .01 level.
This substantiates the classification of concepts into
groups and establishes the difference in connotative mean
ings assigned to each concept by type:
management-supportive, and legal.

union-supportive,

It is clear that the
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concepts as distributed among the three clusters received
responses by labor arbitrators which differentiated their
meanings accordingly.
The original question now can be treated.
degree affect response by type of concept?

Does

The interaction

of degree and type of concept is statistically significant
at the .01 level, according to the information in Table 3-4.
It can be seen that degree by type of concept has an F-ratio
of 6.07 which is significant at the .01 level.
question is answered affirmatively.

Thus, the

Having established

the existence of the relationship between degree and type
of concept, it is appropriate to examine the nature of the
relationship.
Table 3-5 contains the mean scores for all scales
by type of concept for each degree classification.
TABLE 3-5
Total Mean Scores for All Bipolar Scales
by Degree and Type of Concept

Degree
Law
Economics
Other

Union-supportive
4.56
4.68
4.63

Management-support ive
4.86
4.78
4.75

Legal
4.03
3.45
3.14

It is readily apparent that the concepts classified as
legal received much lower scores from all respondent arbi
trators than did either the management-supportive or
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union-supportive concepts.

Generally, both management-

supportive and union-supportive concepts received favorably
high scores.

Other relationships become more apparent with

a graphic illustration of the means as presented in Figure
3-3.

(As in Table 3-5, the means of degree classification

"other" is treated in Figure 3-3.

Although not concerned

with testing the present hypothesis, this information is
conducive to understanding degree relationships and is
necessary in testing the following two hypotheses.

Thus,

it is presented with the testing of the first hypothesis.)
FIGURE 3-3
Means by Degree and Type of Concept

Means
by
Type

.0
.8
.6
.4
.2
5.0
4.8
4.6
4.4
4.2
4.0
3.8
3.6
3.4
.2
.0

Management
Union

Legal

Degree
Law

Economics

Other

Economists had the widest separations among means while
lawyers appear to have the narrowest separations among

means.

The means of "others" generally fall between the

means of lawyers and economists.

Thus, all degree classi

fications considered, the means of lawyers and economists
are the most widely divergent.

The economist-arbitrators'

mean score of 3.45 on the legal concepts was very low rela
tive to the rather neutral score of 4.03 attributed to the
same concepts by lawyer-arbitrators.

The responses of

"other" degrees to the legal concepts, while falling be
tween the lawyers and economists, were somewhat negative
with a mean score of 3.84.
seem to be that,

Two preliminary observations

(1 ) the legal concepts were rated much

lower than the other classifications by all arbitrators,
and (2 ) the divergence in the mean scores of lawyerarbitrators and economist-arbitrators is greater than
other combinations of degrees.
The mean scores contained in Table 3-5 yield
still other relationships when viewed with the additional
perspective of Figure 3-4.

Figure 3-4 represents graph

ically the relationships by degree and type of concept
according to the mean scores for all bipolar scales used
to judge the concepts of the semantic differential test.
Actually, the means of the evaluative scales demonstrated
wider separations, as seen in Figure 3-4

(A), whereas the

narrower differences for the means of the potency scales
tended to reduce the differences of the total mean scores,
as seen in Figure 3-4

(C).

However, the interactions of

FIGURE 3-4
Interactions by Degree and Type of Concept for Evaluative and Potency
Scales and the Total Means

A

B

Evaluative Scales

C
Total Means

Potency Scales

5.6
5.4
5.2
5.0
4.6
4.4
4.2
4.0
3.8
3.6
3.4
3.2
3.0

V

Mgt

Legal

Union

Legend: ------ Law
------ Economics

Mgt

Legal

Union

Mgt

Legal

Union

total mean scores as depicted in Figure 3-4
unaltered.

(B) remained

This graphical representation of mean scores

suggests the nature of the interactions which exist between
degree (Law and Economics)

and type of concept.

As ob

served, these interactions are significant at the .01 level
Of particular importance, as shown in Figure 3-4,
is the reversal of high and low mean scores of lawyerarbitrators and economist-arbitrators for union-supportive
concepts and management-supportive concepts.

While eco

nomists rated union-supportive concepts high with a mean
score of 4.68, lawyers rated union-supportive concepts
lower with a mean score of 4.56.

On the management-

supportive concepts, the lawyers' mean score of 4.86 was
higher than the economists' mean score of 4.78 which repre
sents a reversal in relative positions for union and
management-supportive concepts for lawyer-arbitrators and
economist-arbitrators.
The difference in the mean scores for lawyers
(4.03) and economists

(3.45) on the legal-type concepts

was statistically significant at the .01 level, such dif
ference being statistically identified by a "t" score of
5.13.

No other significant differences by type of concept

were discernable.
The hypothesis being tested suggests the exist
ence of differences in attitudes for lawyer-arbitrators
and economist-arbitrators.

Three of the eight concepts of
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the semantic differential test were significantly different
on this basis, thus justifying acceptance of the present
hypothesis.
Analysis of the Semantic Differential
for Lawyer and "Other" Arbitrators
The second hypothesis is concerned with the rela
tionship between those labor arbitrators who are lawyers
and those who are classified as "other."

More specifically,

the second hypothesis as stated below predicts the existence
of differences in responses for lawyers and "others."
Hypothesis 2:

Lawyer-arbitrators have dif
ferent attitudes about certain
cognitive objects than do arbi
trators classified as "Other."

Test for Differences
It may be noted by reference to Table 3-3 that
the only concept demonstrating a statistically significant
difference for lawyers and "others" is RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS
(potency scales) which has a "t" score of 3.70, which is
significant at the .01 level.
The most obvious interpretation is that the
responses of these two groups, lawyers and "others," were
not meaningfully different.

With the exception of the

concept RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS the meanings attributed to the
concepts were quite similar, as inspection of Exhibits 3-9
through 3-16 will reveal.

Good
Strong
. Successful
Fair
Wide
Important
Flexible
Valuable
Lenient
Delicate
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EXHIBIT 3-10

"THE LABOR MOVEMENT"

Bad
Weak
Unsuccessful

Good
Strong
Successful

Unfair

Fair

Narrow

Wide

Unimportant

Important

Rigid

Flexible

Worthless

Valuable

Severe

Lenient

Rugged

Delicate

Legend: ----- Lawyers
------ Others
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EXHIBIT 3-11

"RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS"

Good

Bad

Strong

Weak

Successful

Unsuccessful
Unfair

Fair

Narrow

Wide
Important

Unimportant
Rigid

Flexible

Worthless

Valuable

Severe

Lenient

Rugged

Delicate

Legend:

— Lawyers
- Others
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EXHIBIT 3-12

"COMPULSORY ARBITRATION"
(Private Sector)
Good
Bad .
. strong

•
-:
•

•

. Successful

•

Unsuccessful

—

\

Unfair

,

\
\

\

•

•
•
•
-•
-

Narrow

V

Unimportant

—

^N
sJS
*

-

_

. Important

•

-

. Flexible
Rigid
\
•

Worthless

W

•

Legend: — --- Lawyers
Others

-

\
N
*
‘
•.
.
. ^

^5

Severe
Rugged

•

•

.
Valuable
m
-

Lenient

•

•

•

.
• Delicate

*
--

-:
-=
—
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EXHIBIT 3-13

"UNION LEADERSHIP"

Good

Bad

Strong

Weak

Successful

Unsuccessful

Fair

Unfair

Wide

Narrow

Important

Unimportant

Flexible

Rigid

Valuable

Worthless

Lenient

Severe

Delicate

Rugged

Legend: -----

Lawyers

------ Others
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EXHIBIT 3-14

"ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY"
Good
Bad
Strong
Weak
Successful
Unsuccessful
Fair
Unfair
Wide
Narrow
Important
Unimportant
Flexible
Rigid
Valuable
Worthless
Lenient
Severe
Delicate
Rugged

Legend: ------- Lawyers

Others
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EXHIBIT 3-15

"MANAGEMENT RIGHTS”

Good
Bad
Strong
Weak
Successful
Unsuccessful
Fair
Unfair
Wide
Narrow
Important
Unimportant
Flexible
Rigid
Valuable
Worthless
Lenient
Severe
Delicate
Rugged ^

Legend: -----

Lawyers
Others
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EXHIBIT 3-16

"UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL
DECISION-MAKING AREAS"
Bad
Weak
Unsuccessful

Good
Strong
Successful

Unfair

Fair

Narrow

Wide

Unimportant

Important

Rigid

Flexible

Worthless

Valuable

Severe

Lenient

Rugged

Delicate

Legend: ----- Lawyers
----- Others

Test for Interactions
Figure 3-5 demonstrates graphically the nature
of the interactions by type of concept for lawyers and
"others."

Although no statistically significant differ

ences were found in their responses to the semantic dif
ferential, the opinions of lawyer-arbitrators and "other"arbitrators were reversed for the management-supportive and
union-supportive concepts.
trate the interaction.

The means of Table 3-5 illus

While lawyer-arbitrators rated

management-supportive concepts high with a mean score of
4.86,

"other"-arbitrators rated the same concepts below this

with a mean score of 4.75.

For the union-supportive con

cepts the means for lawyer-arbitrators was 4.56, which is
lower than the means of 4.63 for "other"-arbitrators.

Note,

also, that the legal concepts followed the same relative
pattern as the management concepts for lawyer-arbitrators
and "other"-arbitrators, receiving higher ratings from the
lawyer-arbitrators.
The hypothesis being tested suggests the exist
ence of differences in attitudes for lawyer-arbitrators and
"other"-arbitrators.

Only one of the eight concepts of the

semantic differential test was significantly different on
this basis.

Therefore, the present hypothesis is rejected.

Consideration will next be given to the final
hypothesis concerning educational degree.

FIGURE 3-5
Interactions by Degree and Type of Concept for Evaluative and Potency
Scales and Total Means
A

B

Evaluative Scales

C

Total Means

Potency Scales

5.6
5.4
5.2
5.0

4.0
3.6
3.4
3.2
3.0
Mgt

Legal

Union

Mgt

Legal

Union

Mgt

Legal

Union

L e gend:------ Law
------ Other
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Analysis of the Semantic Differential for
Economist and "Other" Arbitrators
The third and final hypothesis relative to educa
tion concerns the relationship between those labor arbi
trators who are economists and those who are classified as
"other."

Stated as follows, the third hypothesis predicts

differences in the responses to the semantic differential
of economists and "others."
Hypothesis 3:

Economist-arbitrators have
different attitudes about
certain cognitive objects
than do arbitrators classi
fied as "Other."

Test for Differences
Reference to Table 3-3 will indicate that the
responses to three concepts are statistically significantly
different.

The concept RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS was significantly

different along both dimensions, evaluative and potency.
The evaluative scales had a "t" score of 2.96 which was
significant at the .01 level, while the potency scales had
a "t" score of 2.98 which was significant at the .05 level.
Also judged to be significantly different were
the responses of economists and "other"-arbitrators to
the concept COMPULSORY ARBITRATION.

Both dimensions were

significant, with the evaluative scales having a "t" score
of 3.37, significant at the .05 level, and the potency
scales with a "t" score of 2.85, significant at the .01
level.

88
The concept ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY is statistically
significantly different along the evaluative dimension with
a "t" score of 5.64, which is significant at the .05 level.
A glance at the visual profiles contained in
Exhibits 3-17 through 3-24 reveals that the economists have
taken the more extreme positions.

Economists have estab

lished definitely negative viewpoints toward the concepts
RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS and COMPULSORY ARBITRATION

(Private

Sector), while "others" appear to be only slightly negative
to neutral on both concepts.

While both groups supported

the concept ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY, the economists were de
cidedly more supportive.
Test for Interactions
Figure 3-6 illustrates the nature of the inter
actions for economist-arbitrators and "other"-arbitrators.
The difference in the mean scores for economists(3.45) and
"others"

(3.84) on the legal-type concepts was statis

tically significant at the .01 level, being statistically
represented by a "t" score of 3.45.

No other significant

differences by type of concept were found.
As with the two previous hypotheses, there are
reversals of rankings between types of concepts.

However,

the present reversals are not between management-supportive
and union-supportive concepts, as was the case previously.
Economist-arbitrators rate both management-supportive and
union-supportive concepts above "other"-arbitrators by
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EXHIBIT 3-17

"WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS"

Good

Bad

Strong

Weak

Successful

Unsuccessful
Unfair

Fair

Narrow

Wide
Important

Unimportant
Rigid

Flexible

Worthless

Valuable

Severe

Lenient

Rugged

Delicate

Legend: ---------

Economists
Others
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EXHIBIT 3-18

"THE LABOR MOVEMENT"

Bad .

.

.

.

.

.

. Good
Strong

Weak
Unsuccessful

Successful

Unfair

Fair

Narrow

Wide

Unimportant

Important

Rigid

Flexible

Worthless

Valuable

Severe

Lenient

Rugged

Delicate

Economists
Others
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EXHIBIT 3-19

"RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS"

Bad
Weak
Unsuccessful

Good
Strong
Successful

Unfair

Fair

Narrow

Wide

Unimportant

Important

Rigid

Flexible

Worthless

Valuable

Severe

Lenient

Rugged

Delicate

Legend: ------ Economists
------ Others

92

EXHIBIT 3-20

"COMPULSORY ARBITRATION"
(Private Sector)
Bad
Weak
Unsuccessful

Good
Strong
Successful

Unfair
Narrow
Unimportant

Wide
Important

Rigid

Flexible

Worthless

Valuable

Severe

Lenient

Rugged

Delicate

L e g e n d : ------- Economists
------ Others
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EXHIBIT 3-21

"UNION LEADERSHIP"

Bad
Weak
Unsuccessful

Good
Strong
Successful

Unfair

Fair

Narrow

Wide

Unimportant

Important

Rigid

Flexible

Worthless

Valuable

Severe

Lenient

Rugged

Delicate

Legend:------ Economists
------ Others

EXHIBIT 3 - 2 2

"ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY"
Bad .
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Unsuccessful

Unfair .
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Legend:

Economists
~ Others
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EXHIBIT 3-23

"MANAGEMENT RIGHTS"

Good
Bad
Strong
Weak
Successful

Unsuccessful
Fair
Unfair
Wide
Narrow
Important
Unimportant
Flexible
Rigid
Valuable
Worthless
Lenient
Severe
Delicate
Rugged

Legend:------- Economists
------ Others
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EXHIBIT 3-24

"UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL
DECISION-MAKING AREAS"
Bad
Weak
Unsuccessful
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Successful

Unfair
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Legend:------- Economists
------ Others

FIGURE 3-6
Interactions by Degree and Type of Concept for Evaluative and Potency
Scales and Total Means
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slight margins.

The reversal occurs with the legal con

cepts where economist-arbitrators rate those concepts
significantly lower than do "other"-arbitrators.

As ob

served earlier, economists have, once again, taken the
more extreme position.
The hypothesis being tested suggests the exist
ence of differences in attitudes for economist-arbitrators
and "other"-arbitrators.

Three of the eight concepts of

the semantic differential test were significantly different
on this basis, thus justifying acceptance of the present
hypothesis.
Conclusions
The literature of labor arbitration suggests that
the different educational backgrounds of professional labor
arbitrators may influence arbitral decisions.

The hypoth

eses tested in this chapter were designed to investigate
the differences alleged to exist along educational lines.
Thus, the labor arbitrator respondents of this study were
classified according to educational backgrounds as either
lawyer, economist, or "other."

The following three hypoth

eses were formulated and have been tested.
H.:

Lawyer-arbitrators have different
attitudes about certain cognitive
objects than do economist-arbitrators.

H2 :

Lawyer-arbitrators have different
attitudes about certain cognitive
objects than do arbitrators classi
fied as "Other."

H,:

Economist-arbitrators have different
attitudes about certain cognitive
objects than do arbitrators classified
as "Other."

Generally, the three hypotheses concerned with
educational differences were well-supported by analysis of
the data generated by the semantic differential test.

The

type of degree held by labor arbitrator respondents, Legal,
Economics, or "other," was found to be statistically sig
nificant for four of the eight concepts utilized in the
semantic differential test.

The four concepts were:

RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION

(Private Sector)

ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY, and UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL
DECISION-MAKING AREAS.

It is the contention of this re

searcher that the wide range of attitudinal orientations
to these concepts may be manifested in the decisions of
labor arbitrators.

To the extent that these concepts are

operative in the decision-making process, differences in
decisions may result due to the differences in the educa
tional backgrounds of the labor arbitrators.
More specifically, the first hypothesis, which
suggested differences between lawyer-arbitrators and
economist-arbitrators, was supported by the existence of
statistically significant differences for the following
three concepts:

RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION

(Private Sector), and UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL
DECISION-MAKING AREAS.

Clearly, the existence of these

differences supports the acceptance of Hypothesis 1.

The second hypothesis, concerning lawyers and
"others," was not so well-supported as the initial hypoth
esis.

Only one concept, RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS, was found to

demonstrate statistically significant differences.

This

seems to indicate that lawyer-arbitrators and "other"arbitrators are fairly similar in their attitudes toward
the concepts of the semantic differential test.

Thus, the

second hypothesis is rejected.
The third hypothesis of this study provides
additional insight into the role of educational backgrounds
of labor arbitrators.

It concerns the differences in atti

tudes between economist-arbitrators and "other"-arbitrators
As with the first hypothesis, three concepts were found to
be statistically significantly different:
LAWS, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
EFFICIENCY.

RIGHT-TO-WORK

(Private Sector), and ECONOMIC

As noted earlier in Chapter III, the economist

arbitrators have yielded a consistently more extreme posi
tion toward the concepts than either lawyer or "others."
It is probably this condition which precipitated support
of the first hypothesis as well as the acceptance of this
third hypothesis.
Thus,

the existence of differences due to educa

tional background has been postulated, tested, and found to
exist in two of the three proposed relationships.

Accord

ing to this study, it does make a difference whether the
labor-arbitrator is a lawyer-arbitrator or an economistarbitrator.

CHAPTER IV
RELATIONSHIP OF AGE TO THE SEMANTIC
DIFFERENTIAL TEST
The ages of labor arbitrators in the United
States are characterized by the following two facts:
(1 ) the average age is approximately 60, and

(2 ) younger •

arbitrators entering the field have significantly differ
ing backgrounds in terms of education and experience.^
The first implication drawn from these facts is that as
the supply of labor arbitrators with War Labor Board
experience diminishes, the composition of professional
labor arbitrators will have different characteristics in
terms of age, education, and experience.

For example, in

a recent study it was found that 85.7 percent of labor
arbitrators "under 50" are lawyers.

Continuation of such

a trend would sharply alter the present composition where
lawyers comprise approximately one-half the population of
labor arbitrators in the United States.

^See Brian L. King, "Some Aspects of the Active
Labor Arbitrator," Personnel Journal (February, 1971),
pp. 115-123.
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Both management and labor prefer older, experienced, and established labor arbitrators.

2

The following

hypothesis is designed to test the idea that these pref
erences may be quantitatively justifiable,

in terms of

differences in the personal value systems of young and
older labor arbitrators.

If so, then there may be implica

tions to be drawn in terms of the changing age composition
of labor arbitrators.
Hypothesis 4:

Younger arbitrators have
different attitudes about
certain cognitive objects
than older arbitrators.

Classification of Labor Arbitrators
The respondent arbitrators were classified by
age and distributed as follows:
Age
less than 50 years
50 - 60 years
over 60 years

Number

Percent

28
57
67

18.42
37.50
44.08

152

100.00%

This sample reflects the fact that, as a group, labor arbi
trators tend to be older, even approaching retirement age.
The following section will test differences between age
groups.

o

Brian L. King, "Management and Union Attitudes
Affecting the Employment of Inexperienced Labor Arbitra
tors," Labor Law Journal (January, 1971) , p. 23.

Test for Differences
As indicated in Table 3-1, the only concept to
demonstrate a statistically significant difference between
age groups was UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL DECISION
MAKING AREAS.

This concept was significant along both

dimensions, evaluative and potency, at the .05 level.

As

before, this determination was made through the analysis
of variance technique for the three age classifications.
And, as before, the Ht" test was used to isolate the paired
classifications with significant differences.

The mean

scores used to accomplish the "t" test are given below:
Group
1
2
3

Age

P

less than 50 years
5 0 - 6 0 years
over 60 years

(E)

P

4.82
4.52
4.16

(P)
4.17
4.14
3.89

A significant difference was found to exist be
tween those labor arbitrators who were less than 50 years
of age and those who were over 60 years of age for the
concept UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING
AREAS

(evaluative scales).

nificant at the .01 level.

The "t" score of 3.18 is sig
Also, those labor arbitrators

over 60 years of age differed significantly with the age
group 50-60 years of age.

The "t" score of 2.21 was sig

nificant at the .05 level, for the same concept.

The

greater the age difference, the more significant the dif
ference.
The age groups discussed above were also found
to have significant differences for the concept UNION
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PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING AREAS
scales).

(potency

The over 60 age group was found to differ sig

nificantly from the less than 50 group as well as the
50-60 group, with "t" scores of 2.17 and 2.47, respectively,
each at the .05 level of significance.
A glance at Exhibit 4-8 will demonstrate visually
the differences discussed in the previous two paragraphs.
The over 60 age group is decidedly negative in their
reactions to the concept UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL
DECISION-MAKING AREAS, while the younger labor arbitrators
are neutral to positive in their responses.
the concept MANAGEMENT RIGHTS

And, although

(Exhibit 4-7) did not reveal

a statistically significant difference for the age varia
ble, it is interesting to note that the relative positions
of the younger arbitrators and older arbitrators are re
versed from the reactions to the concept UNION PENETRATION
OF MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING AREAS.

The older arbitrators

demonstrate greater support for the concept MANAGEMENT
RIGHTS than the younger arbitrators.

This reversal is

apparently consistent since the two concepts are, to a great
extent, mutually exclusive.
Test for Interactions
A test for interaction between the variable age
and concepts, as classified in Chapter III, into managementsupportive,

labor-supportive, and legal concepts was
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EXHIBIT 4-1

"WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS"

Bad
Weak
Unsuccessful

Good
Strong
Successful

Unfair

Fair

Narrow

Wide

Unimportant

Important

Rigid

Flexible

Worthless

Valuable

Severe

Lenient

Rugged

Delicate

Legend: ------ Less Than 50 Years
------ 50-60 Years
------ Over 60 Years
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EXHIBIT 4-2

"THE LABOR MOVEMENT"

Good

Bad

Strong

Weak

Successful

Unsuccessful
Unfair

Fair

Narrow

Wide
Important

Unimportant
Rigid

Flexible

Worthless

Valuable

Severe

Lenient

Rugged

Delicate

Legend: ------ Less Than 50 Years
------ 50-60 Years
—

•—

Over 60 Years
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EXHIBIT 4-3

"RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS"

Good

Bad

Strong

Weak

Successful

Unsuccessful

Fair

Unfair

Wide

Narrow
V

Unimportant

Flexible

Rigid

Valuable

Worthless

Lenient

Severe

Delicate

Rugged

L e g e n d : ------ Less Than 50 Years
------ 50-60 Years
—

.—

Important

Over 60 Years
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EXHIBIT 4-4

"COMPULSORY ARBITRATION"
(Private Sector)
Good

Bad

Strong

Weak

Successful

Unsuccessful
Unfair

Fair

Narrow

Wide
Important

Unimportant
Rigid

Flexible

Worthless

Valuable

Severe

Lenient

Rugged

Delicate

Legend: --------—

Less Than 50 Years
50-60 Years
Over 60 Years
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EXHIBIT 4-5

"UNION LEADERSHIP"

Bad .

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Good
Strong

Weak

Successful

Unsuccessful
Unfair

Fair

Narrow

Wide
Important

Unimportant
Rigid

Flexible

Worthless

Valuable

Severe

Lenient

Rugged

Delicate

Legend: ------ Less Than 50 Years
------ 50-60 Years
—

Over 60 Years
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EXHIBIT 4-6

"ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY"

Good

Bad
Weak

44

Strong

-

Successful

Unsuccessful

Fair
Wide

Narrow

Important

Unimportant

Flexible

Rigid

Valuable
Severe

Lenient

Rugged

Delicate

Legend: ------Less Than 50 Years
-----

50-60 Years

—

Over 60 Years

•—
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EXHIBIT 4-7

"MANAGEMENT RIGHTS”

Bad
Weak
Unsuccessful

Good
Strong
Successful

Unfair

Fair

Narrow

Wide

Unimportant
Rigid
Worthless
Severe
Rugged

Legend:------ Less Than 50 Years
------ 50-60 Years
------ Over 60 Years

Important
Flexible
Valuable
Lenient
Delicate
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EXHIBIT 4-8

"UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL
DECISION-MAKING AREAS"
Bad
Weak
Unsuccessful

Good
Strong
Successful

Unfair

Fair

Narrow

Wide

Unimportant

Important

Rigid

Flexible

Worthless

Valuable

Severe

Lenient

Rugged

Delicate

Legend: ------ Less Than 50 Years
------ 50-60 Years
------ Over 60 Years
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performed in an effort to identify any further relation
ships.

None of statistical significance were found.
Conclusion
The projected change in the age composition of

professional labor arbitrators in the United States implies
a possible change in value systems of future arbitrators.
This inference served as the rationale for investigating .
any possible differences in values between younger and
older labor arbitrators as they exist today.

This investi-

tation was accomplished by testing the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4:

Younger arbitrators have
difference attitudes about
certain cognitive objects
than older arbitrators.

The hypothesis is not well-supported by the data
"analysis.

Only one concept, UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL

DECISION-MAKING AREAS, was found to be significantly dif
ferent between age groups.

Where this occurred, it seemed

to result from the more extreme position taken by those
labor arbitrators over 60 years of age.

It was also ob

served that this older group gave more support to the con
cept MANAGEMENT RIGHTS which to a degree is the mirror
concept of UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING
AREAS.

From this, it may be suggested that the older arbi

trators may be more management-supportive than the younger
labor arbitrators.
However, this hypothesis is rejected due to lack
of support.

CHAPTER V
RELATIONSHIP OF EXPERIENCE TO THE
SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL TEST
It was noted in Chapter I that the one indispen
sable qualification for becoming a labor arbitrator is
mutual acceptance by management and labor.

Such acceptance

seems to be almost solely a function of actual arbitral
experience.

In fact, those who are established, experienced

labor arbitrators have been accorded special status in being
referenced as " m a i n l i n e r s . A c c o r d i n g to Prasow,

"...

the line of demarcation between a fringe arbitrator and a
mainliner.

. . occurs when the losing party begins to scru

tinize the arbitrator's opinion not seeking where the arbi
trator had erred, but. . . to find out where he (the party)
2
was wrong."
There is no doubt that management and labor
prefer the services of experienced arbitrators.

3

Davey

"^Paul Prasow and Edward Peters, Arbitration and
Collective Bargaining: Conflict Resolution in Labor Rela
tions (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1970),
pp. 284-293.
2

Ibid. , p. 285.

3
See William J. Kilber, "The FMCS and Arbitration:
Problems and Prospects," Monthly Labor Review (April, 1971),
p. 40? and Brian L. King, "Some Aspects of the Active Labor
Arbitrator," Personnel Journal (February, 1971), pp. 115123.
114

contends that a key challenge for the future is

. . how

to cope effectively with the problem of a short supply of
competent, experienced/ and acceptable arbitrators in the
face of an increasing demand for the services of 'informed
neutrals'.

. . .

(The extreme difficulty in gaining ac

ceptability through experience was noted earlier.)
Supposedly, the desire for experienced labor arbi
trators is based primarily on a feeling held by the parties
that the decisions of experienced arbitrators are more "pre
dictable" than would be the decisions of inexperienced arbi
trators.

Fleming's research in the area does not support

this thesis, and he asserts, " . . .

they

(the parties)
5

ought not be so concerned about trying new arbitrators."
Further, Fleming suggests that,

. . if the management

prerogative question is involved, it is possible to ascer
tain an individual arbitrator's views

(emphasis added) on

that subject from published decisions."®

The implication

is that experienced labor arbitrators may hold different
views about significant concepts which may influence their
decisions.

4
Harold W. Davey, Contemporary Collective Bar
gaining (New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), p. 159.
5
R. W. Fleming, The Labor Arbitration Process
(Urbana, Illinois:
The University of Illinois Press, 1965)
p. 104.
6Ibid., p. 104.

The objective of this chapter is to determine
whether the arbitrator respondents to this study hold dif
ferent views of specific concepts, such as MANAGEMENT
RIGHTS as suggested above, and whether the differences
are related statistically to direct experience as a labor
arbitrator.

In addition, non-arbitral experience, such as

federal employment and union membership experience will
receive consideration.
Analysis of Direct Labor Arbitration Experience
For purposes of this study, direct labor arbi
tration experience was "measured" by:
ence as a labor arbitrator,

(1) years of experi

(2) actual number of arbitral

decisions rendered, and (3) whether the arbitrator respond
dent considers himself

(or herself) to be employed on a

full-time or part-time basis.

Three individual hypotheses

have been designed to test each measure of direct arbitra
tion experience against the data yielded by the semantic
differential test.
Experience in Terms of Years as an Arbitrator
The first hypothesis to test direct arbitration
experience concerns experience in terms of years and is
stated below:
Hypothesis 5:

More experienced arbitrators,
in terms of y e a r s , have dif
ferent attitudes about certain
cognitive objects than less
experienced arbitrators.

Classification of Labor Arbitrators
The respondent arbitrators were classified accord
ing to years as a labor arbitrator and distributed as
follows:
Years
less than 5 years
5 - 3 0 years
more than 30 years

Number
8
84
60

Percent
5.26
55.26
39.48

152

100.00%

The sample distribution reflects the proposition
that the field of labor arbitration is composed of heavilyexperienced professionals.

Arbitrators with less than five

years' experience comprise 5.26 percent of the sample while
the remaining 94.74 have more than five years' experience.
Almost 40 percent of the sample have served as labor arbi
trators for more than 30 years and remain active as arbi
trators.

The classification with the greatest representa

tion is the middle group with 5-30 y e a r s ' experience and
55.26 percent of the sample.

Should differences exist on

the basis of years of experience, the present sample is
adequately distributed to reveal such differences.

The

next step is to test the hypothesis.
Test for Differences
The first measure of direct arbitration experi
ence to be analyzed is years as an active labor arbitrator.
The concept COMPULSORY ARBITRATION

(potency scales)

is the

single concept to be judged statistically significantly
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different for experience in terms of years.

The level of

significance is .05, as reflected in Table 3-1.

Again, it

is necessary to use the "t" test to discover where the
actual significant differences exist.

The mean scores used

for this purpose are given below:
Experience
less than 5 years
5 - 3 0 years
more than 30 years

C (P)
3.97
3.15
3.37

C (E)
5.37
4.22
4.11

The statistically significant difference was
found to exist between those labor arbitrators with less
than five years of arbitral experience and those with 5-30
years of arbitral experience.

It appears that the less

experienced group responded neutrally to the concept with
a mean score of 3.97, while the 5-30 year group was decid
edly negative with a mean score of 3.15.
Considering the fact that the younger arbitrators
coming into the field tend to be lawyers and the lawyers
expressed favorable responses to COMPULSORY ARBITRATION as
opposed to economists

(refer to Chapter I I I ) , this finding

is consistent with the findings of Chapter III for this
concept.

(That is, the younger, less experienced lawyer-

arbitrators tend to support the idea of compulsory arbitra
tion. )
Exhibit 5-1 presents a visual observation of the
relative responses to the concept COMPULSORY ARBITRATION,
which is the only concept found to be significantly dif
ferent.
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EXHIBIT 5-1

"COMPULSORY ARBITRATION"

Good

Bad

Strong

Weak

Successful

Unsuccessful
Unfair

Fair

Narrow

Wide
Important

Unimportant
Rigid

Flexible

Worthless

Valuable

Severe

Lenient

Rugged

Delicate

Legend: ------ Less Than 5 Years' Arbitral Experience
------ 5-30 Years' Arbitral Experience
—

•—

Over 30 Y e a r s ' Arbitral Experience
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Test for Interactions
Labor arbitration experience as measured by
years was then tested for possible interaction with the
concepts of the semantic differential test as classified
into management-supportive, labor-supportive, and legal
concepts according to Chapter III.

No such interactions

were found to exist.
The present hypothesis is not supported by the
analysis of the responses to the semantic differential
test, as only one concept was found to be statistically
significantly different due to arbitral experience in
terms of years.
Experience in Terms of Numbers of
Arbitration Cases Decided
The next measure of direct arbitral experience,
and probably the one most relied upon by labor and manage
ment, is the number of arbitration cases actually decided
by the respondent arbitrators.

The following hypothesis

was developed to test this measurement of labor arbitration
experience:
Hypothesis 6 :

More experienced arbitrators,
in terms of decisions, have
different attitudes about cer
tain cognitive objects than
less experienced arbitrators.

Classification of Labor Arbitrators
The respondent arbitrators were classified ac
cording to actual numbers of arbitration decisions rendered
and distributed as follows:
No. of Decisions
less than
51 - 200
more than

50
200

Number

Percent

21
53
78

13.82
34.86
51.32

152

100.00%

As with experience measured in terms of y e a r s ,
the sample distribution for number of decisions reflects
the view that labor arbitrators as a group are very experi
enced professionals.

More than one-half of the respondent

arbitrators have rendered in excess of 2 0 0 arbitral deci
sions, and more than 86 percent have decided 50 or more
cases.

Only 13.82 percent indicate experience of fewer

than 50 cases.

The composition of this sample should re

veal any significant differences which may exist for experi
ence as measured by numbers of arbitral decisions.
Test for Differences
The present hypothesis to be tested asserts that
statistically significant differences exist for labor arbi
trators and such differences depend upon the numbers of
arbitration cases decided by the sample respondents.

Ac

cording to the analysis of variance performed on the data,
no such relationship exists.

Test for Interactions
No interaction was found to exist between experi
ence in terms of decisions and type of concept.
Experience as a Full-Time or Part-Time Arbitrator
Exclusive of those labor arbitrators ". . . o n
the staffs of state agencies such as those in New York and
Massachusetts," there are only " . . .
. . . ."

7

perhaps 30 to 50

full-time labor arbitrators in the United States.

The following hypothesis deals with the amount of time the
labor arbitrator devotes to his
Hypothesis 7:

(or her) arbitration work.

Part-time arbitrators have
different attitudes about
certain cognitive objects
than full-time arbitrators.

Classification of Labor Arbitrators
The respondent arbitrators were classified ac
cording to whether they considered themselves to be engaged
in labor arbitration on a full-time or part-time basis and
were distributed as follows:
Time
full-time
part-time

Number

Percent

30
122

19.73
80.27

152

100.00%

Comparing the sample size of full-time arbitra
tors to the estimate of Professor Davey, above, it appears
that

(1 ) the full-time arbitrators are over-represented,

7

Davey, 0 £. c i t . , p. 180.

and (2 ) that perhaps the reason is a sizable number of the
full-time respondents are employed by state agencies.
Nevertheless, the next step is to test the hypothesis.
Test for Differences
Two concepts, THE LABOR MOVEMENT and RIGHT-TOWORK LAWS, were found to be statistically significant as
to whether the respondent arbitrators considered themselves
to be engaged on a part-time or full-time basis.

THE LABOR

MOVEMENT was significant along the potency dimension with
an F value of 6 .8 6 , significant at the .01 level
Table 3-1).

(refer to

The concept of RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS was found to

be statistically significant along the evaluative dimension
with an F value of 4.31, significant at the .05 level.
Exhibits 5-2 and 5-3 illustrate the semantic
profiles of full-time and part-time labor arbitrators.

It

appears that both groups felt very positive about THE LABOR
MOVEMENT and quite negative about the concept RIGHT-TO-WORK
LAWS.

The important relationship to note is that full-time

labor arbitrators assumed the extreme position for each
concept, indicating that as a group they tended to have
stronger feelings about both concepts.
Test for Interactions
No interactions were found to exist between the
amount of time, part-time or full-time, and the concepts of
the semantic differential test as classified into
management-supportive, labor-supportive, and legal concepts.

EXHIBIT 5-2

"THE LABOR MOVEMENT"
Bad .
weak .
Unsuccessful

Unfair .

Successful

Narrow .
Unimportant
Rigid .

Important

worthless

Severe .

valuable

Rugged .

Lenient
Uelicate

Legend:

—

Full-time

- Part-time
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EXHIBIT 5-3

"RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS"

Bad

Good

Weak

Strong

Unsuccessful

Successful

Unfair

Pair

Narrow

Wide

Unimportant

Important

Rigid

Flexible

Worthless

Valuable

Severe

Lenient

Rugged

Delicate

Legend:------ Full-time
-----

Part-time
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The hypothesis being tested suggests that full
time labor arbitrators have different attitudes than parttime arbitrators.

Only two concepts of the semantic

differential test were found to be significantly different
in support of the present hypothesis.

Therefore, the

hypothesis is rejected.
Results for Direct Labor Arbitration Experience
As mentioned previously, the only criteria for
success as a labor arbitrator is acceptance by management
and labor.

Acceptance is largely a function of direct

experience as a labor arbitrator.

The increasing shortage

of acceptable labor arbitrators raises a question as to the
real significance of experience to the arbitrator.

More

specifically, do significant differences exist between the
less experienced and more experienced labor arbitrators?
Three measures of direct labor arbitration experience were
incorporated into three hypotheses designed to be tested for
differences between less experienced and more experienced
arbitrators.

The results of such testing were definitely

negative for each of the three hypotheses.
Hypothesis 5 concerned direct labor arbitration
experience in terms of years of experience as an arbitrator.
Only one concept, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION, was found to be
statistically significant.

This hypothesis is rejected.

Hypothesis 6 concerned direct labor arbitration
experience in terms of numbers of arbitration decisions
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previously rendered.

Although acceptance by the parties

depends largely on the numbers of arbitral decisions ren
dered, no significant difference was found to exist for any
concept of the semantic differential test between relatively
inexperienced and heavily experienced labor arbitrators.
(Note by reference to Table 3-1 that this important varia
ble was the only one where no statistical significance
existed for any of the eight concepts.)

Therefore, Hypoth

esis 6 is resolutely rejected.
Hypothesis 7 concerned direct labor arbitration
experience in terms of time devoted to arbitration work,
either full-time or part-time.

Two concepts were found to

be statistically significantly different:
MENT and RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS.

THE LABOR MOVE

This final hypothesis con

cerning the significance of direct labor arbitration experi
ence is rejected.
In the next section non-arbitration experiences
will be tested for significant differences in responses to
the semantic differential data.
Analysis of Non-Arbitration Experience
As well as being concerned with the respondents'
direct labor arbitration experience, this study seeks to
examine other aspects of experience not directly related
to arbitral experience.

For this purpose, non-arbitration

experience is analyzed in terms of:

(1 ) previous work

experience with the United States Department of Labor, the
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NLRB, W L B , or other government agencies concerned with the
labor sector,
firm,

(2 ) previous employment as a manager in a

(3) labor union membership experience,

residence

(U.S. divided into four regions:

(4) place of
North, East,

South, W e s t ) , and (5) membership in The National Academy
of Arbitrators.

Five individual hypotheses have been

designed to test each measure of non-arbitration experience
against the data yielded by the semantic differential test.
The reason for this researcher's interest in nonarbitration experience is best illustrated by the following
statement of Davey.

"They

(the parties)

also rarely accept

experienced labor relations prospects as arbitrators if the
experience of the would-be arbitrator was gained on either

g
the management or the union side of the bargaining table."
The implication of this statement is that as a result of
previous experience the parties "feel" that the "would-be
arbitrator" may have internalized the values espoused by
either management or labor and may, therefore, be precondi
tioned to support the views of one party against the other,
and could not act in an entirely "objective" and "impar
tial" manner.

This study is partially an attempt to iden

tify the differences, if any, in attitudes of labor arbi
trators attributable to their non-arbitration experience.
Toward this end the first hypothesis dealing with non
arbitration experience will now be tested.

g
Davey, op. cit., p. 181.
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Experience in Terms of Federal Employment
The following hypothesis suggests that experience
as a federal employee may influence the attitudes of labor
V

arbitrators as reflected by results of the semantic dif
ferential test.
Hypothesis 8 :

Arbitrators who have worked
for a federal labor agency
have different attitudes about
certain cognitive objects than
those who have not been em
ployed by a federal labor agency.

Classification of Labor Arbitrators
The respondent arbitrators were classified ac
cording to whether or not they had been employed by a
federal government agency concerned with the labor sector,
such as The United States Department of Labor, the NLRB,
or the WLB.

Classification and distribution of the respond

ents are reflected in the following data.
Federal
Experience
yes
no

Number

Percent

81
_71

53.29
46.71

152

100.00%

The sample distribution is indicative of ". . .
how most of the mainline arbitrators got on the ground
floor of private arbitration after the War

(WW II) was

over" by obtaining labor-relations experience through a
government agency, normally the War Labor Board

(WW II)
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or the National Labor Relations Board.

9

Over 53 percent of

the respondents to this study indicated they had such ex
perience.

Is there a difference in attitudes between those

with such experience and those without such experience as
measured by the semantic differential test?
Test for Differences
Referring to Table 3-1, it is apparent that the
following four concepts successfully differentiated those
respondents with federal agency experience and those with
out federal experience:

THE LABOR MOVEMENT, RIGHT-TO-WORK

LAWS, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION, and MANAGEMENT RIGHTS.
THE LABOR MOVEMENT (potency scales) was statis
tically significantly different at the .05 level with an
F-score of 4.34.

The difference in responses to the po

tency scales may be observed in Exhibit 5-4.

Evidently,

those respondent arbitrators with federal experience view
THE LABOR MOVEMENT as less imposing or forceful than those
without federal experience.
The next concept to be found statistically signif
icantly different is RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS at the .01 level
of significance for the evaluative scales with an F-score
of 7.82.

As seen in Exhibit 5-5, those arbitrators with

federal experience held consistently more negative view
points toward this concept than those without federal

g

Prasow, 0 £. e x t ., p. 285.
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experience.

However, both were decidedly opposed to this

concept, except for one instance where those arbitrators
without federal experience judge the concept as fairly
important.
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION is found to be statis
tically significantly different for evaluative scales at
the .05 level with an F-score of 4.15.

Those respondents

with federal experience are decidedly opposed to the con
cept of COMPULSORY ARBITRATION while those arbitrator
respondents without such experience seem to be rather neu
tral, as visually determined with reference to Exhibit 5-6.
The concept of MANAGEMENT RIGHTS is found to be
statistically significantly different for evaluative scales
at the .05 level with an F-score of 3.66.

Although both

groups expressed favorable views toward the concept, those
with federal experience were not so strong in their views
as the respondent arbitrators without federal experience,
as demonstrated visually in Exhibit 5-7.
It may be noted by reference to Exhibits 5-4
through 5-7 that the responses of respondents with federal
experience to each concept judged as significantly differ
ent are generally to the left of the responses by those
arbitrators without federal experience; among those with
federal experience, less support is indicated for each
concept.
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EXHIBIT 5**4

"THE LABOR MOVEMENT"

Bad
Weak
Unsuccessful

Good
Strong
Successful

Unfair

Fair

Narrow

Wide

Unimportant

Important

Rigid

Flexible

Worthless

Valuable

Severe

Lenient

Rugged

Delicate

L e g e nd : ------ Federal Employment Experience
------ No Federal Employment Experience
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EXHIBIT 5-5

"RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS"

Good

Bad

Strong

Weak

Successful

Unsuccessful
Unfair

Fair

Narrow

Wide
Important

Unimportant
Rigid

Flexible

Worthless

Valuable

Severe

Lenient

Rugged

Delicate

Legend: ----- - Federal Employment Experience
-----

No Federal Employment Experience
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EXHIBIT 5-6

"COMPULSORY ARBITRATION"
(Private Sector)
Bad

Good

Weak

Strong

Unsuccessful

Successful

Unfair

Fair

Narrow

Wide

Unimportant

Important

Rigid
Worthless

Flexible
V
.

Valuable

Severe

Lenient

Rugged

Delicate

Legend: ------ Federal Employment Experience
-----

No Federal Employment Experience
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EXHIBIT 5-7

"MANAGEMENT RIGHTS"

Bad .

Unsuccessful

•

•

•

•

•

----:—
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-/
•

. Good

•

.
• strong

A

•

/ si------ :—
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i ---- ------------- -

Fair
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.
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•
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1------ :------ / /
//

r

•
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*

. important
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. Flexible
^

Rigid

•____ :-. Valuable

Worthless
•

Severe
Rugged •

Legend:

•

«

1 /
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. Lenient
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Federal Employment Experience
------ No Federal Emplo y m e n t Experience

. Delicate
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Test for Interactions
Non-arbitration experience, as measured in terms
of federal experience, was tested for possible interaction
with the concepts of the semantic differential test classi
fied as management-supportive, union-supportive, and legal
concepts

(see Chapter III).

It was found that the concepts

as classified were differentiated by federal experience at
the .01 level of significance with an F-score of 14.91.
Further, interactions were found to exist according to
federal experience and by type of concept at the .01 level
with an F-score of 9.04, as may be seen in Table 5-1.
TABLE 5-1
Analysis of Variance for Federal Experience,
Type of Concept, and Interactions

Source

d.f

Regression
Fed
Type
Fed * Type
Error

5
1
2
2

448

s .s
97.91
4.98
86.89
6.04
149.70

F-ratio

m.s
19.58
4.98
43.45
3.02
.33

58.60**
14.91**
130.01**
9.03**

**Level of Significance = .01
The interactions are presented graphically in
Figure 5-1.

The differences in responses for the concepts

classified as legal are much greater than the differences
for either management-supportive or union-supportive con
cepts, and probably account for the severity of the
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interaction.

It may be noted that no reversals are present

as there were with education.

The information shown in

Exhibits 5-4 through 5-7 indicates the responses of arbitra
tors with federal experience.

These responses are consist

ently to the left of arbitrators without federal experience.
As Figure 5-1 shows, the federally-experienced arbitrators
generally scored below the non-federally experienced arbi
trators .
The hypothesis being tested suggests that working
experience with the federal government may serve to influ
ence the attitudes of those labor arbitrators having had
such experience.

Clearly, four of the eight concepts of

the semantic differential test were significantly different
on this basis, and this is adequate support to justify ac
ceptance of this hypothesis.
Experience in Terms of Managerial Employment
The next hypothesis dealing with non-arbitration
experience is related to work experience as a manager in a
firm.
Hypothesis 9:

Arbitrators who have held
management positions in private
firms have different attitudes
about certain cognitive objects
than those without such manage
ment experience.

Classification of Labor Arbitrators
The respondent arbitrators were classified accord
ing to whether or not they had been employed as managers

FIGURE 5-1
Interactions by Federal Employment Experience and Type of Concept for
Evaluative and Potency Scales and Total Means

A

B

Evaluative Scales

C
Total Means

Potency Scales

5.8

5.2
5.0

4.2

3.4
3.2
3.0
Mgt.

Legal

Union

Mgt.

Legal

Union

Mgt.

Legal

Union

Legend:-----— Federal Employment Experience
------ No Federal Employment Experience
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for a firm and the distribution is as follows:
Management
Experience
yes
no

Number

Percent

70
82

46.05
53.95

152

100 .00 %

Although it seems generally accepted that the
parties prefer not to employ as arbitrators individuals
with management backgrounds, 46 percent of this sample is
made up of arbitrators with such management experience.
Does management experience affect the labor arbitrators'
attitudes as measured by the semantic differential test?
Test for Differences
According to information in Table 3-1, the follow
ing concepts were found to be statistically significantly
different for those respondent arbitrators with experience
as managers and those lacking such experience:
ERSHIP and ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY.

UNION LEAD

In addition, the concept

MANAGEMENT RIGHTS approached the .05 level of significance
and will receive consideration in the following paragraphs.
The concept UNION LEADERSHIP was found to be
statistically significantly different at the .05 level with
an F-score of 4.32 along the evaluative dimension.

It will

be noted by reference to Figure 5-8 that the attitudes of
those labor arbitrators with managerial experience were
more favorably disposed toward the concept UNION LEADERSHIP
than those arbitrators without such management experience.

ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY was found to be statistically
significantly different along both dimensions, evaluative
and potency.

The evaluative dimension was found signifi

cant at the .01 level with an F-score of 7.02, while.the
potency dimension was found significantly different at the
.01 level with an F-score of 7.48.

The labor arbitrators

with managerial experience were generally more supportive
of the concept ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY than those without such
experience.

Evidently, the labor arbitrators experienced

as managers consider ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY to be more impor
tant than those without managerial experience.
The concept MANAGEMENT RIGHTS approached the pre
determined level of significance of .05 for this study with
an F-score of 3.28, which was found to be significant at the
.07 level.

This finding merits consideration due to the

importance of the concept MANAGEMENT RIGHTS to the area of
labor-management relations.

Exhibit 5-10 demonstrates the

greater support given this concept by arbitrators with
managerial experience as opposed to those without mana
gerial experience.
It may be noted by reference to Exhibits 5-8
through 5-10 that labor arbitrators with managerial expe
rience were more supportive of all significant concepts
than those arbitrators without management experience.

Test for Interactions
Non-arbitration experience, as determined in
terms of management experience, was then tested for possi
ble interaction with the concepts of the semantic differ
ential test as classified into management-supportive,
union-supportive, and legal concepts according to Chap
ter III.

It was found that the concepts as classified

were differentiated by managerial experience at the .05
level with an F-score of 4.54.

(This finding is mainly

attributable to differences for evaluative scales.)

How

ever, no interactions were found to exist according to
managerial experience and by type of concept.
The hypothesis being tested indicated that those
labor arbitrators who have had experience as a manager in
a firm may have attitudes different than arbitrators with
no management experience.

Two concepts, UNION LEADERSHIP

and ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY, were found to be significantly
different in support of the present hypothesis.

In addi

tion, the concept MANAGEMENT RIGHTS approached the .05
acceptable level of significance at the .07 level and,
therefore, lends some further support to acceptance of the
hypothesis.

Further, it is to be considered that two of

the three concepts are classified as management-supportive
concepts and one would suspect that these concepts would
receive greater support from arbitrators with previous
management experience as opposed to arbitrators with no
management experience.

The present hypothesis is accepted.
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EXHIBIT 5-8

"UNION LEADERSHIP"

Bad
Weak
Unsuccessful

Good
Strong
Successful

Unfair

Fair

Narrow

Wide

Unimportant

Important

Rigid

Flexible

Worthless

Valuable

Severe

Lenient

Rugged

Delicate

Legend:------ Managerial Experience in Private Firm
------ No Managerial Experience in Private Firm
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EXHIBIT 5-9

"ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY"

Bad
Weak
Unsuccessful

Good
Strong
Successful
Fair

Narrow
Unimportant
Rigid

Wide
Important
Flexible
Valuable

Severe

Lenient

Rugged

Delicate

Legend:------ Managerial Experience
------ No Managerial Experience
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EXHIBIT 5-10

"MANAGEMENT RIGHTS"

Good

Bad

Strong

Weak

Successful

Unsuccessful

Fair
Wide

Narrow

Important

Unimportant

Flexible

Rigid

Valuable
Severe

Lenient

Rugged

Delicate

Legend:

Managerial Experience
------ No Managerial Experience
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Experience as a Labor Union Member
The next hypothesis concerned with non-arbitration
experience is related to the respondent arbitrators' expe
rience or non-experience as a labor union member.
Hypothesis 10:

Arbitrators who have held union
membership have different atti
tudes about certain cognitive
objects than arbitrators with
out union membership experience.

Classification of Labor Arbitrators
The respondent arbitrators were classified accord
ing to whether or not they had held union membership and
the distribution is as follows.
Union-membership
Experience

Number

Percent

yes
no

55
_97

36.18
63.82

152

100.00%

It has been held that individuals who have been
labor union members are not generally acceptable by the
parties as labor arbitrators.

Yet, over 36 percent of the

respondent arbitrators indicated that they had previously
held membership in a labor union.

Does such experience

influence the labor arbitrators' attitudes as measured by
the semantic differential test?
Test for Differences
The following two concepts were found to be
statistically significantly different for respondent

arbitrators who had been union members and those who had
not:

WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS and COMPULSORY ARBITRATION

(Private Sector) .
The concept WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS was found to
be statistically significantly different at the .01 level
with an F-score of 6.00 along the evaluative dimension.
The concept COMPULSORY ARBITRATION

(Private Sector) was

found to be statistically significantly different at the
.05 level with an F-score of 3.97 along the potency dimen
sion.

Both concepts were generally approved by all respond

ents without distinction according to union membership
experience, as seen in Figures 5-11 and 5-12.
Test for Interactions
Non-arbitration experience as measured by pre
vious union membership experience was then tested for
possible interaction with the concepts of the semantic
differential test as classified into management-supportive,
union-supportive, and legal concepts

(see Chapter III).

An analysis of variance was performed on the data and the
results for the evaluative scales are recorded in Table 5-2
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EXHIBIT 5-11

"WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS"

Bad
Weak
Unsuccessful

Good
Strong
Successful

Unfair

Fair

Narrow

Wide

Unimportant

Important
Flexible

Worthless

Valuable

Severe

Lenient

Rugged

Delicate

L e g e n d : ------ Union Membership Experience
------ No Union Membership Experience
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EXHIBIT 5-12

"COMPULSORY ARBITRATION"
(Private Sector)
Bad
Weak
Unsuccessful
Unfair
Narrow
Unimportant
Rigid
Worthless
Severe
Rugged

Lege n d :------ Union Membership Experience
------ No Union Membership Experience

Good
Strong
Successful
Fair
Wide
Important
Flexible
Valuable
Lenient
Delicate
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TABLE 5-2
Analysis of Variance for Labor Union Membership,
Type of Concept, and Interactions

d.f

Source
Regression
Labor
Type
Labor * Type
Error
♦Level of
**Level of

s.s

5
1
2
2
448

214.55
0.16
210.41
3.97
245.34

m. s
42.91
0.16
105.20
1.99
.055

F-ratio
78.35
0.30
192.11**
3.63*

Significance = .05
Significance = .01
The concepts of

classified

thesemantic differential

in Chapter III demonstrate a

test as

significant differ

ence at the .01 level with an F-ratio of 192.11.

In addi

tion, the interaction between types of concepts and labor
union experience is found to be significant at the .05
level with an F-ratio of 3.63.
Of particular importance to the present hypoth
esis is the reversal of high and low scores for managementsupportive and union-supportive concepts, as illustrated in
Figure 5-2.

The respondent arbitrators with union member

ship experience rated union-supportive concepts higher
than those respondent arbitrators without such experience.
This situation reversed for the management-supportive con
cepts where the union-experienced respondent arbitrators
rated these concepts lower than did those arbitrators with
out union membership experience.

The mean evaluative score

FIGURE 5-2
Interactions by Union Membership Experience and Type of Concept for
Evaluative and Potency Scales and Total Means

A

B

Evaluative Scales

C
Total Means

Potency Scales

5.8
5.6
5.4
5.2
5.0

4.4
4.2
4.0
3.8
3.6
3.4
3.2
3.0
Mgt.

Legal

Union

Mgt.

Legal

Union

Mgt.

Legal

Union

L e g e nd: ------ Union Membership Experience
------ No Union Membership Experience
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for arbitrators with union experience is 5.24; the mean
evaluative score for non-experienced arbitrators is 5.48.
For the union-supportive concepts the mean evaluative
scores are 5.29 for arbitrators with union experience and
5.07 for arbitrators without union membership experience.
Experience as a labor union member seems to influence the
attitudes of the respondent arbitrators as measured by the
semantic differential test.

The nature of the influence

is to give more support to those concepts which are unionsupportive and less support to those concepts which are
management-supportive.
As interesting as these findings may be, they do
not adequately support acceptance of the present hypothesis.
Experience in Terms of Residence
The next hypothesis concerned with non-arbitration
experience is related to the respondent arbitrators' geo
graphic location.

For the purpose of testing this hypoth

esis, the United States was divided into four regions:
North, East, South, and West.

The classification of any

particular state may be determined by reference to Figure
1-4.

The specific hypothesis to be tested follows:
Hypothesis 11:

Arbitrators' attitudes about
certain cognitive objects are
a function of their geographic
location.
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Classification of Labor Arbitrators
The respondent arbitrators were asked to give
their state of residence a n d .150 of the 152 usable respon
ses complied with this request, making it possible to lo
cate them geographically.

They were then classified by

region and the distribution is as follows:
Region

Number

Percent

North.
East
South
West

55
37
34
24

36.67
24.67
22.66
16.00
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1 0 0 .00%

Test for Differences
There were two concepts found to be statistically
significantly different in comparing the responses to the
semantic differential test by geographical region.
two concepts were COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
and MANAGEMENT RIGHTS.

These

(Private Sector)

The "t" test was used to isolate

the paired classifications with significant differences.
The mean scores used to accomplish the "t" test are given
below:
Geographical
Region
North
East
South
West

C (E) Means

M (E) Means

4.81
4.06
3.62
3.98

5.49
4.84
5.65
5.15

The concept COMPULSORY ARBITRATION

(Private

Sector) was found to be significantly different for those
respondent arbitrators from the North as compared to each
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of the three other regions.
East comparison was 2.61,

The "t" score for the North-

significant at the .01 level; for

the North-South comparison the "t" score was 4.16, signifi
cant at the .01 level; and for the North-West comparison
the "t" score was 2.59, which is significant at the .05
level.

None of the additional comparisons between the

regions East, South, and West were significant.
A glance at Exhibit 5-13 indicates the rather
neutral position adopted by the North as compared to the
other three regions.

There seems to be much stronger sup

port for the idea of COMPULSORY ARBITRATION existing among
the respondent arbitrators residing in the North, or at
least they are not as opposed to the concept as the rest
of the labor arbitrators throughout the United States.
The other concept found to be statistically
significantly different by geographic location was MANAGE
MENT RIGHTS.

There are three comparisons of significance.

The North-East comparison again is significantly different
at the .01 level with a "t" score of 3.35.

The East-South

comparison is significantly different at the .01 level with
a "t" score of 3.75, and the South-West comparison is sig
nificant at the .05 level with a "t" score of 2.06.

Exhibit

5-14 represents the semantic profiles of the various re
gions and indicates that the responses of arbitrators re
siding in the South exhibit the strongest support for the
concept MANAGEMENT RIGHTS.

This would seem to be in

EXHIBIT 5-13

"COMPULSORY ARBITRATION”
(Private Sector)
Bad .

Weak .
Unsuccessful
Unfair .
Narrow .
Unimportant .

Rigid .
Worthless .

Flexible

Severe .

valuable

Rugged .

s. Lenient
Delicate

Legend:

North
East
South
'* • West
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EXHIBIT 5-14

"MANAGEMENT RIGHTS"

Good

Bad

Strong

Weak

Successful

Unsuccessful
Unfair

Fair

Narrow

Wide
Important

Unimportant
Rigid

Flexible

Worthless

Valuable

Severe

Lenient

Rugged

Delicate

Legend: -----

North

----- East
------ South
.....

West

keeping with the general reputation of the South as being
more conservative than other parts of the United States.
Test for Interactions
The respondent arbitrators' geographic location
was treated as a type of non-arbitration experience and was
tested for possible interaction with the concepts of the
semantic differential test as classified into managementsupportive, union-supportive, and legal concepts.

An analy

sis of variance test was performed on the data and the re
sults for the potency scales are recorded in Table 5-3.
TABLE 5-3
Analysis of Variance for Geographical Location,
Type of Concept, and Interactions

Source

d.f

Regression
Residence
Type
R e s . * Type
Error

11
3
2
6
436

s .s
23.21
2.22
16.59
4.39
147.70

m. s

F-ratio

2.11
.77
8.29
.73
.34

6.22
2.19
24.49**
2.16*

*Level of Significance = .05
**Level of Significance = .01
As before, the concepts as classified in Chap
ter III demonstrate a statistically significant difference
at the .01 level with an F-ratio of 24.49.

In addition,

the interaction between types of concepts and geographic
location is found to be significant at the .05 level with
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an F-ratio of 2.16.

This significant interaction is appar

ently the result of the significant differences of the mean
responses by geographic location to the legal concepts.
Figure 5-3 demonstrates visually these relationships.

More

specifically, the significant differences are a direct re
sult of the relatively high mean score assigned the legal
concepts by those respondent arbitrators from the North.
The responses by Northern arbitrators were slightly above
neutral

(4.0) at 4.02 while the remaining regions were de

cidedly negative with scores of:

East = 3.60, South = 3.72,

and West = 3.58.
Although not judged as statistically significant,
note the reversals between North and South responses for
evaluative scales for management-supportive and unionsupportive concepts, as seen in Figure 5-3 (A).

Also, note

similar reversals for the potency scales East and South.
In both cases the respondent arbitrators from the South
gave more relative support to the management-supportive
concepts and less relative support for the union-supportive
concepts.
Although the present hypothesis has received
support from interesting sources as well as demonstrating
significant interactions, it is felt that an adequate
amount of support is lacking and the hypothesis is rejected.

FIGURE 5-3
Interactions by Geographic Location and Type of Concept for
Evaluative and Potency Scales and Total Means

A

B

Evaluative Scales

C
Total Means

Potency Scales

5.8

5.2
5.0
4.6
4.4
4.2
4.0
3.8
3.6
3.4
3.2
3.0

//

\v:

Union

Legal

Mgt.

Mgt

Legal

Union

Mgt.

Legal

Union

Legend:------ North
------ East
—

.—

South

...... West
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Experience as a NAA Member
The final hypothesis concerning non-arbitration
experience is related to t h e .respondent arbitrators' mem
bership or non-membership in the National Academy of Arbi
trators.
Hypothesis 12:

Arbitrators who are members
of the National Academy of
Arbitrators have different
attitudes about certain cog
nitive objects than non-members.

NAA membership is severely restricted to experi
enced labor arbitration practitioners, as established in
Chapter I .
Classification of Labor Arbitrators
The respondent arbitrators were classified accord
ing to NAA membership and the distribution follows:
NAA Membership
yes
no

Number

Percent

75
77

49.34
50.66

152

100.00%

The sample response reflects to a substantial
degree the composition of the sample mail-out which was
50 percent
members.

(200) NAA members and 50 percent

(200) non

Testing of the final hypothesis will conclude

this portion of the study.
Test for Differences
The only concept found to be statistically sig
nificantly different for respondent arbitrators according

to NAA membership or non-membership is UNION PENETRATION
OF MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING AREAS.

This concept was

found to be significant at the .01 level with an F-ratio
of 6.54 along the potency dimension.

A glance at Exhibit

5-15 reveals that NAA member arbitrators, as well as non
member arbitrators, generally consider the concept to be
rather neutral.

And, although significant differences

exist, it appears that no real distinction is made as to
which group has stronger feelings about the concept.

The

reason, as demonstrated by the semantic profile, is that
one-half of the scales indicate stronger responses by the
NAA members and the remaining one-half of the scales indi
cate weaker responses by NAA membership.

The remaining

step in the analysis is to test for interactions.
Test for Interactions
Non-arbitration experience in terms of NAA mem
bership was then tested for possible interaction with the
concepts of the semantic differential test as classified
into management-supportive, union-supportive, and legal
concepts, according to Chapter III.

An analysis of vari

ance was performed on the data and the results for the
total means are recorded in Table 5-4.
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EXHIBIT 5-15

"UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL
DECISION-MAKING AREAS"
Bad
Weak
Unsuccessful

Good
Strong
Successful

Unfair

Fair

Narrow

Wide

Unimportant
Rigid
Worthless
Severe
Rugged

Legend: ------ NAA
- - Non-NAA

Important
Flexible
Valuable
Lenient
Delicate
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TABLE 5-4
Analysis of Variance for NAA Membership,
Type of Concept, and Interactions

Source

d.f

Regression
NAA
Type
NAA * Type
Error

5
1
2
2
448

s. s

m.s

98.08
.36
87.04
4.66
155.53

18.41
.36
43.07
2.33
.34

F-ratio
53.06
1.05
125.36**
6.72**

**Level of Significance = .01
The concepts of the semantic differential as
classified in Chapter III are significantly different at
the .01 level with an F-ratio of 125.36.

The interaction

between types of concepts and NAA membership is found to
be significant at the .01 level with an F-ratio of 6.72.
The interactions are graphically illustrated in Figure 5-4.
Apparently the interactions resulted due to the lower
scores attributed to the legal concepts by those respondent
arbitrators holding NAA membership.

However, the management-

supportive and union-supportive concepts received higher
scores from NAA members than non-members.

This may evidence

a greater respect for both institutions, management and
union, by NAA members.
The hypothesis being tested is not well-supported
and must be rejected.

FIGURE 5-4
Interactions by NAA Membership and Type of Concept for
Evaluative and Potency Scales and Total Means
B
Total Means

Evaluative Scales

Potency Scales

5.6
5.2
5.0

4.4
4.0
3.8
3.6
3.4
3.2
3.0

_L

Mgt.

Legend:

Legal

Union

Mgt.

Legal

Union

Mgt.

Legal

Union

NAA Member
Non-Member
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Results for Non-Arbitration Experience
Non-arbitration experience in terms of management
employment and labor union membership is quite often the
reason for rejection of arbitrator candidates by the par
ties.

The obvious implication is that the parties feel

that such experience will render the individual less "ob
jective” and, thus, bias his decision.

If this is the

case, perhaps other forms of non-arbitration experience
may also influence the attitudes of labor arbitrators.
Hence, this study has identified five forms of non
arbitration experience resulting in the design of five
individual hypotheses which have been tested against the
semantic differential data.

The results for these hypoth

eses are summarized below.
Hypothesis 8 indicates that previous employment
with the federal government in an agency dealing with the
labor sector, such as the NLRB or WLB, may influence the
attitudes of labor arbitrators as reflected by the results
of the semantic differential test.

Four of the eight con

cepts of the semantic differential test proved to be
statistically significantly different.
concepts are:

The significant

THE LABOR MOVEMENT, RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS,

COMPULSORY ARBITRATION (Private Sector), and MANAGEMENT
RIGHTS.
accepted.

Thus, the hypothesis is well-supported and was
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Hypothesis 9 suggests that the attitudes of labor
arbitrators may be influenced by previous managerial employ
ment as reflected by the results of the semantic differen
tial test.

Two of the eight concepts of the semantic dif

ferential test were found to be statistically significantly
different with a third concept nearly significant.

The

significant concepts are UNION LEADERSHIP and ECONOMIC
EFFICIENCY, and the concept that was almost significant is
MANAGEMENT RIGHTS.

These three concepts include the two

concepts labeled as management-supportive.

Primarily on

this basis the hypothesis was accepted.
Hypothesis 10 suggests that labor union member
ship experience may influence the attitudes of labor arbi
trators as determined by the semantic differential test.
Two of the eight concepts of the semantic differential test
were found to be statistically significantly different.
They are:
TION.

WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS and COMPULSORY ARBITRA

This hypothesis, although partially supported, was

rejected.
Hypothesis 11 maintained that the attitudes of
labor arbitrators may vary depending on their geographic
residence.

This hypothesis was partially supported.

Sig

nificant differences were found for the two concepts of
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION and MANAGEMENT RIGHTS.
hypothesis was rejected.

However, the

Hypothesis 12 concerned labor arbitrators as
members or non-members of the National Academy of Arbitra
tors.

More specifically, the hypothesis states that the

attitudes of labor arbitrators may vary depending on NAA
membership.

A single concept, UNION PENETRATION OF MANA

GERIAL DECISION-MAKING AREAS, proved to be statistically
significantly different.

This final hypothesis of the

study was rejected.
Conclusions
Direct labor arbitration experience is the pri
mary criteria utilized for selection of individual arbi
trators by labor and management.

When a choice exists

between an experienced and an inexperienced arbitrator,
it is generally accepted that the parties select the ex
perienced arbitrator.

The hypotheses tested in this chap

ter were designed to disclose differences alleged to exist
between the experienced and inexperienced arbitrators.
For hypotheses formation, two different aspects
of experience were identified:

(1) direct arbitration

experience, and (2) non-arbitration experience.

Direct

labor arbitration experience was "measured" by:

(1) years

of experience as an arbitrator,

(2) actual number of arbi

tral decisions rendered, and

(3) whether the arbitrator

respondent considers himself

(or herself)

on a full-time or part-time basis.

to be employed

The following three
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hypotheses concerning direct arbitration experience were
formulated and tested:
H,.:

More experienced arbitrators, in terms
of years, have different attitudes
about certain cognitive objects than
less experienced arbitrators.

H fi:

More experienced arbitrators, in terms
of decisions, have different attitudes
about certain cognitive objects than
less experienced arbitrators.

H_:

Part-time arbitrators have different
attitudes about certain cognitive ob
jects than full-time arbitrators.

Each of the previously mentioned hypotheses con
cerning direct arbitration experience was rejected.
The second aspect of experience, non-arbitration
experience, was "measured" by:

(1) federal employment with

an agency concerned with the labor sector, such as the
NLRB, WLB, or United States Department of Labor,
agement experience with a firm,
union member,

(2) man

(3) experience as a labor

(4) residence according to geographic loca

tion, and (5) NAA membership.

The following five hypoth

eses concerning non-arbitration experience were formulated
and tested:
Hg:

Arbitrators who have worked for a
federal labor agency have different
attitudes about certain cognitive ob
jects than those who have not been
employed by a federal labor agency.

Hq :

Arbitrators who have held management
positions in private firms have different
attitudes about certain cognitive objects
than those without such management ex
perience.

H,q :

Arbitrators who have held union
membership have different attitudes
about certain cognitive objects than
arbitrators without union membership
experience.

Hll:

Arbitrators' attitudes about certain
cognitive objects are a function of
their geographic location.

H12:

Arbitrators who are members of the
National Academy of Arbitrators have
different attitudes about certain
cognitive objects than non-members.

Hypothesis 8 was supported very well by the
analysis of the semantic differential data which indicated
significant differences for these four concepts:

THE LABOR

MOVEMENT, RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION, and
MANAGEMENT RIGHTS.

Thus, Hypothesis 8 was accepted.

Hypothesis 9 was supported by the existence of
significant differences for the two concepts UNION LEADER
SHIP and ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY, as well as by a third con
cept, MANAGEMENT RIGHTS, which was almost at the acceptable
level of significance

(.05) at .07.

Primarily because of

the specific concepts involved, Hypothesis 9 was accepted.
Hypotheses 10, 11, and 12 were rejected.

How

ever, Hypotheses 10 and 11 were supported by the existence
of significant differences for two concepts each.

Hypoth

esis 12 demonstrated a significant difference on one concept.
The most important finding of Chapter V is that
experiences other than direct arbitration experience proved
to be important in differentiating the attitudes of pro
fessional arbitrators.

Direct arbitration experience is
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not a source of attitudinal differences for labor arbitra
tors, according to the results of this study.

The signifi

cant differences which were identified were essentially
non-arbitral in nature, such as federal employment, manage
ment employment, and union membership experience.
"Arbitrators, unlike judges, do not have a common
professional background, nor are they all trained in the
same system of t h i n k i n g . T h e

results of this study

reflect and support that statement.

■^Fleming, o p . c it. , p. 79.

CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS,
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Summary and Conclusions
World War II and the policies of the National War
Labor Board served as the springboard for growth and accept
ance of grievance arbitration as a viable alternative to
industrial strife.

Many labor arbitrator practitioners of

today gained entry into the field as a direct result of
experience gained through such governmental agencies as the
NWLB and the NLRB.

These and others have gained entry to

the field also as a result of judicial and/or academic
backgrounds as the parties searched for informed neutrals.
As a result, the 300 to 400 labor arbitrators handling 90
percent of the labor arbitration cases tend to be either
highly experienced lawyers or economists.
Looking to the future, it appears that attorneys
are gaining support as replacements for the labor arbitra
tors who leave the field.

With this notion in mind, the

research was established to determine whether differences
exist in the attitudes of professional labor arbitrators
based on education, age, and experience.

The literature

recognizes the possibility that differences in educational
backgrounds, lawyer versus economist, may determine the
170
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outcome of an arbitration award.

The parties are reluctant

to select an individual who is not highly experienced as
an arbitrator.

The notion became evident that empirical

research was needed in order to evaluate the attitudinal
overtones implicit in the practices of labor and management.
Thus, a primary research effort was undertaken in an effort
to determine the existence of attitudinal differences based
on education, age, and experience.

A summary of the. hypoth

eses tested in this study, together with results by educa
tion, age, and experience, follows.
The following three hypotheses are designed to
determine the effects, if any, of educational background
on the attitudes of labor arbitrators.
H.:

Lawyer-arbitrators have different atti
tudes about certain cognitive objects
than economist-arbitrators.

H2 :

Lawyer-arbitrators have different atti
tudes about certain cognitive objects
than arbitrators classified as "Other."

•

Economist-arbitrators have different
attitudes about certain cognitive ob
jects than arbitrators classified as
"Other."

The following hypothesis is designed to determine
the effect, if any, of age on the attitudes of labor arbi
trators.
H.:

Younger arbitrators have different
attitudes about certain cognitive
objects than older arbitrators.
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The following hypotheses were designed to deter
ment the effect, if any, of experience on the attitudes of
labor arbitrators.
Hypotheses concerning direct arbitration experi
ence:
H_:

More experienced arbitrators, in terms
of years, have different attitudes about
certain cognitive objects than less ex
perienced arbitrators.

Hg:

More experienced arbitrators, in terms
of decisions, have different attitudes
about certain cognitive objects than
less experienced arbitrators.

H_:

Part-time arbitrators have different
attitudes about certain cognitive ob
jects than full-time arbitrators.

Hypotheses concerning non-arbitration experience:
..H g :

Arbitrators who have worked for a federal
labor agency have different attitudes
about certain cognitive objects than
those who have not been employed by a
federal labor agency.

Hg :

Arbitrators who have held management
positions in private firms have different
attitudes about certain cognitive objects
than those without such management ex
perience.

H.0 :

Arbitrators who have held union member
ship have different attitudes about
certain cognitive objects than arbitra
tors without union membership experience.

H., :

Arbitrators' attitudes about certain
cognitive objects are a function of their
geographic location.

h 12:

Arbitrators who are
National Academy of
different attitudes
nitive objects than

members of the
Arbitrators have
about certain cog
non-members.
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The data used to test the preceeding hypotheses
were gathered by sending 400 questionnaires to professional
labor arbitrators.

Each of the 152 respondent arbitrators

completed a semantic differential test by evaluating the
following eight concepts in terms of 10 bipolar adjective
scales:
WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS
THE LABOR MOVEMENT
RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION

(Private Sector)

UNION LEADERSHIP
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
MANAGEMENT RIGHTS
UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL DECISION
MAKING AREAS
Along with the semantic differential test the
questionnaire gathered information on the respondent arbi
trators' educational backgrounds, ages, and experiences.
Of the 400 questionnaires mailed out, 202 or 51 percent
were returned and of these, 152 or 43 percent were usable
for analytical purposes.

The summary and conclusions of

this empirical research follow.
Education Influences the Attitudes
of Respondent Arbitrators
To test the three hypotheses concerned with edu
cation, the respondent arbitrators were classified accord
ing to academic degree:

Law, Economics, and "other."
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Then, the means of the semantic differential scores were
tested for statistically significant differences at the
.05 level of significance.
Lawyers and economists were the concern of
Hypothesis 1 and they demonstrated differences on these
three concepts:

RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION

(Private Sector), and UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL
DECISION-MAKING AREAS.

The first hypothesis was accepted.

The attitudes of lawyer-arbitrators were different from
those of economist-arbitrators, as reflected by the semantic
differential data.

Another important finding revealed that

economist-arbitrators rated union-supportive concepts higher
than did lawyer-arbitrators, while on management-supportive
concepts the scores of lawyer-arbitrators were higher than
economist-arbitrators.

Although the differences in mean

scores were not statistically significant, the reversal
suggests that the attitudes of lawyer-arbitrators are more
favorably disposed toward management, while the attitudes
of economist-arbitrators tend to be more supportive of
labor unions.
The attitudes of economist-arbitrators were
definitely negative toward the legal concepts:
PRICE CONTROLS, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION

WAGE AND

(Private Sector),

and RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS, whereas lawyer-arbitrators tended
to be neutral to positive, indicating a more favorable
relative feeling toward these concepts.

It is likely that
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the response of lawyer-arbitrators is reflective of their
judicial backgrounds.
The second hypothesis suggested differences in
attitudes for lawyer-arbitrators and "other"-arbitrators.
Only one concept proved to be significantly different,
RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS.

This hypothesis was rejected.

Appar

ently, the attitudes of lawyer-arbitrators and "other"arbitrators are rather similar.

However, the test for

interaction revealed a reversal similar to the finding for
the first hypothesis.

Again, lawyer-arbitrators gave more

credence to the management-supportive concepts while
"others" gave their support to the union-supportive con
cepts.

Thus, in comparison to economist-arbitrators and

"other"-arbitrators, the lawyer-arbitrators were consistent
in their support for management-supportive concepts as
opposed to the union-supportive concepts.

Also, the

lawyer-arbitrators, once again, demonstrated favorable
attitudes toward the legal concepts as compared to the
unfavorable response of "other"-arbitrators.
The third and final hypothesis concerning educa
tion compared economist-arbitrators to "other"-arbitrators.
Three concepts were found to be significantly different:
RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
and ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY.

(Private Sector),

The third hypothesis was accepted.

The analysis of the data revealed that the significant dif
ferences were due to the economist-arbitrators opting for
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more extreme positions on each concept.

It appears that

the economist-arbitrators have expressed stronger views
than "other"-arbitrators.

This is especially evident with

the analysis for interactions in which economist-arbitrators
rated both management-supportive and union-supportive con
cepts higher than did "other"-arbitrators, and rated the
legal concepts lower than did "other"-arbitrators.
The different educational backgrounds of labor
arbitrators are responsible for the significant differences
in their responses to the semantic differential test.

In

asmuch as the responses of ”other"-arbitrators generally
fall between the responses of lawyer-arbitrators and
economist-arbitrators, the significant finding involves
primarily lawyer-arbitrators and economist-arbitrators.
This finding becomes more important when it is noted that
"other"-arbitrators comprise only 12.5 percent of this
research sample and probably less than that of the popula
tion.

According to this study, whether the arbitrator is

a lawyer or economist becomes significant.
Age Influences the Attitudes
of Respondent Arbitrators
The respondent arbitrators were classified accord
ing to Age as follows:
and over 60 years.

less than 50 years, 50-60 years,

Only one concept, UNION PENETRATION OF

MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING AREAS, proved to be significantly
different, and that was along both dimensions, evaluative
and potency.

This hypothesis was rejected.

The first
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significant difference was between those arbitrators less
than 50 years of age and those over 60 years of age, and
occurred along the evaluative.dimension at the .01 level
of significance.

The second significant difference was

between those arbitrators 50-60 years old and those over
60 years old, and occurred along the potency dimension at
the .05 level.

Thus, the greater the age difference the

greater the level of significance.
The over 60 years of age group responded rather
negatively to the concept while the younger groups were
neutral to positive in their responses.

Thus, the atti

tudes of the older group toward UNION PENETRATION OF MANA
GERIAL DECISION-MAKING AREAS was definitely unfavorable.
It is interesting to note, also, that the older group
responded most favorably to the concept MANAGEMENT RIGHTS.
Apparently, the older arbitrators support management to
a greater extent than younger arbitrators.

Should the

average age of future arbitrators become younger, as appears
likely, management may lose whatever support derives from
the attitudinal differences between younger and older
arbitrators.
Certain Types of Experience Influences
the Attitudes of Respondent Arbitrators
Labor and management are reluctant to employ the
services of inexperienced labor arbitrators.

Due to this

reluctance, one purpose of this study was to ascertain any
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possible differences in the attitudes of respondent arbi
trators based on differences in experience.

In order to

test a full range of experience, this variable was classi
fied initially into

(1) direct arbitration experience and

(2) non-arbitration experience.

Data based on direct

arbitration experience were gathered and classified accord
ing to (1) years as a labor arbitrator,

(2) numbers of

arbitration decisions rendered, and (3) whether the arbi
trator considered himself as devoting full time or part
time to arbitration activities.

Each classification of

direct arbitration experience was represented by separate
hypotheses to be tested against the semantic differential
data.

Hypothesis 5, concerning direct arbitration expe

rience in terms of years, was rejected, as only one con
cept, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
be significant.

(Private Sector), proved to

Hypothesis 6, concerning direct arbitra

tion experience in terms of numbers of arbitral decisions,
was rejected, as there were no concepts found to be signi
ficantly different for this variable.

Hypothesis 7, con

cerning the amount of time devoted to arbitration activi
ties, was rejected, although two concepts were found to be
significantly different:
WORK LAWS.

THE LABOR MOVEMENT and RIGHT-TO-

Thus, all three hypotheses concerning direct

labor arbitration experience were rejected.

Even though

the parties rely heavily in their arbitrator selection pro
cess on the single factor of direct arbitration experience,
this study has found no rational basis for this approach.

Non-arbitration experience was classified into
five different types of experience:

(1) employment expe

rience with a federal a g e n c y ,concerned with the labor sec
tor,

(2) management experience with a firm,

membership experience,
membership.

(3) labor union

(4) state of residence, and

(5) NAA

Data were gathered on each type of non

arbitration experience and analyzed against the semantic
differential data, to test each associated hypothesis.
Hypothesis 8, concerning federal experience, was accepted,
as there were four concepts of the semantic differential
test which were significantly different.
cepts were:

These four con

THE LABOR MOVEMENT, RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS, COM

PULSORY ARBITRATION

(Private Sector), and MANAGEMENT RIGHTS

Hypothesis 9, concerning experience as a manager in a firm,
was accepted, with two concepts being significantly differ
ent at the .05 level, UNION LEADERSHIP and ECONOMIC EF
FICIENCY.

Additional support was provided by the concept

MANAGEMENT RIGHTS which, at .07, was close to the pre
determined level of significance.

One would suspect that

an individual who had been a manager would rate managementsupportive concepts higher than those individuals without
such experience, and this is precisely what occurred.
Hypothesis 10, concerning union membership experience, was
rejected, although significant differences were found for
two concepts, WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS and COMPULSORY ARBI
TRATION (Private Sector).

Another important finding was

that those respondent arbitrators with union membership
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experience rated the union-supportive concepts higher than
those arbitrators without such experience.

Further, those

arbitrators without union membership experience rated the
management-supportive concepts higher than did arbitrators
who had been union members.

It appears that union member

ship experience does have some influence on the attitudes
of respondent arbitrators.
Hypothesis 11, concerning geographic residence,
was rejected, although significant differences were found
for two concepts, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
and MANAGEMENT RIGHTS.

(Private Sector)

The differences for the former

concept were primarily due to the rather neutral to posi
tive score of Northern arbitrators while all other regions
responded negatively.

Whereas, the differences for the

concept MANAGEMENT RIGHTS seemed to be caused by the more
positive support coming from Southern arbitrators.

Hypoth

esis 12, concerning NAA membership, was rejected, as only
one concept proved to be significantly different, UNION
PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING AREAS.
The following summary provides a quick comparison
of the results for direct arbitration experience and non
arbitration experience.

Hypothesis

Experience
Classification
Direct
EXPY
EXPN
TIME

H
H
H

Concepts on Which
Attitudes Differed

Arbitration
(years)
(decisions)
(full or part)

Non-Arbitration
FED (federal employment)
MGT (management
experience)
LABOR (union membership)
RES (residence)
NAA (membership)

8
9

10

C
L,R
L,R,C,M
U,E,M(.07)
W,C
C,M
P

According to the results of this study, manage
ment and labor have been relying on the wrong type of
experience in their selection procedures.

Direct labor

arbitration experience did not influence to an appreciable
extent the attitudes of the respondent arbitrators as mea
sured by the semantic differential data.

In fact, expe

rience, in terms of numbers of arbitration cases decided,
was the only one of 12 variables tested by this study which
failed to be differentiated by at least one concept of the
semantic differential test.
By a large margin, the differences in attitudes
based on experience resulted from non-arbitral kinds of
experience.

The attitudes of respondent arbitrators were

statistically significantly different based on
experience and (2) management experience.

(1) federal

Further, the

attitudes of respondent arbitrators were differentiated by

two concepts each for union membership experience and
state of residence.
The results of this study rather conclusively
state that the attitudes of labor arbitrators are not in
fluenced by direct arbitration experience, but appear to
be derived from non-arbitration types of experience.

Per

haps the parties should begin to look more extensively
into the backgrounds of the individuals selected to hear
their arbitration cases.
Implications
It is the part of equity to make allow
ances for human weaknesses; to look not
to the law but to the legislator; not to
the letter of the law but to the purpose
of the lawgiver; not to the action alone
of the accused, but to the inherent moti
vation of his action; not to the isolated
part but to the whole; not to the character
of a man as he appears at the moment but
to his habitual or life mode of behavior;
for him to remember the good he has re
ceived rather than the evil, endure a wrong
with patience; to be disposed to reach a
decision through discussion rather than by
direct action; to prefer to engage in arbi
tration rather than litigation in court,
for the arbitrator looks to what is reason
able but the judge is concerned with the
interpretation of the law.
For this reason
the arbitrator was conceived so that equity
might thrive.I

A ri s t o t l e , Rhetoric (Translated by Barbara E.
Killian).
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What is reasonable to one arbitrator may be un
reasonable to another.

What is equitable to one arbitrator

may seem inequitable to another.

What would prompt manage

ment to select a lawyer-arbitrator to hear a case concern
ing a union-security clause at a federal installation in a
Right-to-Work state?

Why would a lawyer-arbitrator sustain

management in one discharge case while a second and identi
cal (according to management, maybe stronger) discharge
case, involving the same parties, was decided for the grievant by an economist-arbitrator?

Reiterating an earlier

(p. 16) quotation of Parsons:
Beliefs and values are actualized, partially
and imperfectly, in realistic situations of
social interaction and the outcomes are al
ways co-determined by the values and the
realistic exigencies.
This study has verified empirically the value and attitu
dinal differences resulting from differing educational and
experiential backgrounds of labor arbitrators.

Associating

these findings with the labor arbitrator's decision-making
model developed in Chapter I, the most apparent implication
of this study is that the decisions of labor arbitrators
may be expected to vary depending upon their educational
and experiential backgrounds.
Extension of this implication to the policies of
the parties in selecting individual labor arbitrators to
hear specific cases involving specific issues, it would
likely be advantageous to match as closely as possible the
issue and the arbitrator's background.

This is precisely
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what occurred in the case involving union security at a
federal installation in a Right-to-Work state.

Management

wanted a strictly legal interpretation, persisted on a
lawyer-arbitrator hearing the case, and won.

The findings

of this study indicate that lawyer-arbitrators hold posi
tive viewpoints of legal concepts

(including Right-to-Work

laws) as opposed to the decidedly negative attitudes of
economist-arbitrators.
The same pattern holds in terms of "framing the
issue."

Suppose, for example, that the grievance involved

a transfer of work outside the bargaining unit.

According

to the results of this study, it would be advantageous for
management to plead the virtues of "economic efficiency"
to an economist-arbitrator, especially in the case of a
marginal firm, whereas for a lawyer-arbitrator, management
would be wise to argue on the basis of "management rights."
Another implication is derived from the educa
tional differences of labor arbitrators, and based on the
finding that economist-arbitrators are more favorably dis
posed toward union-supportive concepts.

To the extent that

the process of labor arbitration has assisted labor in the
erosion of management's prerogatives, it may be that
economist-arbitrators are more responsible than lawyerarbitrators.
A most important implication of these findings
concerning policy is that perhaps the concept of speciali
zation is appropriate to labor arbitrators.

Certainly
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there are issues better decided by lawyers than economists,
others better decided by economists than lawyers, and
still others better decided by engineers.

Specialization

would more certainly and rapidly contribute to the devel
opment of a more cohesive body of generalizations and
arbitral standards, resulting in a system of industrial
jurisprudence.
The foregoing are among the more salient impli
cations based on the differences in educational back
grounds of labor arbitrators.

They are meant to be

illustrative, as the writer feels certain that additional
implications of this research will be forthcoming.

The

writer will next consider implications deriving from dif
ferences in experiential backgrounds of labor arbitrators.
The first implication concerns direct-arbitration
experience, primarily in terms of numbers of arbitral deci
sions rendered.

Management and labor are reluctant to make

use of qualified new arbitrators who lack direct case expe2
rience.
As a direct result, in this writer's opinion the
supply of acceptable labor arbitrators is kept artificially
low.

Of all hypotheses tested in this study, the hypoth

esis concerning direct arbitration experience in terms of
numbers of cases decided was the only one to receive abso
lutely no support.

2

There were no differences in the

Harold W. Davey, Contemporary Collective Bargain
ing (New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972) , p. 160.
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attitudes of labor arbitrators based on numbers of cases
decided.

Even though the parties rely extensively on this

criteria in their selection process, this study has found
no rational basis for this approach.
In terms of policy considerations it seems at
least plausible that the supply of labor arbitrators could
be expanded through more extensive use of qualified new
arbitrators with a lower level exposure to risk
decisions)

than previously assumed.

(of bad

This position is cor

roborated by Fleming's research demonstrating the simi
larities in arbitral decisions of inexperienced and
experienced labor arbitrators.

3

The risk could be further

reduced in terms of effect by somehow equating the need
for experience with the complexity and importance of the
specific arbitration case.

In this manner an inexperienced

arbitrator may be allowed to hear comparatively simple and
less important cases early in his career while progressing
toward the more complex and more important arbitral issues.
Results of this study indicate that direct arbi
tration experience is not a source of attitudinal differ
ences, but that non-arbitration experience is a source of
attitudinal differences, specifically federal experience
and managerial experience.

The logical implication of this

finding is that perhaps the parties have been relying

3

R. W. Fleming, The Labor Arbitration Process
(Urbana, Illinois:
The University of Illinois Press,
1965), p. 104.

inadvertantly upon the wrong type of experience in their
selection procedures.

Perhaps management and labor need

to be more concerned in their selection process with the
predispositions and attitudes of arbitrators who have been
employed by the federal government in an agency concerned
with the labor sector.
An important implication concerns the finding
that management experience does influence the attitudes
of labor arbitrators.

Those labor arbitrators with such

experience displayed stronger support for management con
cepts than those without such experience.

Evidently, the

reluctance of the parties to use qualified new arbitrators
who have had management experience is well-founded.

Based

on this finding, it is advantageous for management to
select an arbitrator with management experience to hear
cases involving issues concerning management rights and
economic efficiency.

Of course, the union would wisely

reject such candidates.

It is not surprising that such

practice already exists.
Recommendations
In seeking firm ground for their decisions,
arbitrators rely not only on their inter
pretation of the agreement, the imperatives
of industry, and on the common law of the
shop but also on the dominant values of the
larger society.
The arbitrator, by having
recourse to these changing social values,
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helps to speed their infusion into the
work place and he thereby contributes to
the extension of democracy in industrial
life.4
This study has demonstrated empirically what has
been, up to this point, based mainly upon a priori reason
ing:

that values among labor arbitrators differ and depend

upon their educational and experiential backgrounds.

If

indeed this is the case, then one must be concerned with
which of the dominant and changing societal values are
being "infused into the work place," and at what point,
and at what rate, and by whom?
The first recommendation of this researcher is
further expansion and refinement of the attitudinal data
base for labor arbitrators.

Through additional empirically

based behavioral research a more composite framework of
attitudes and values of labor arbitrators may be identified
and analyzed.

Along with acquiring direct information from

labor arbitrators, management and labor should be queried
as to the role of perceived value orientations in the
selection of particular labor arbitrators.

Indeed, investi

gation of the selection process of management and labor may
prove to be equally as fruitful as directly accessing the
ranks of arbitrators.

This is especially important since

4Eli Ginzberg, e t . a l ., Democratic Values and the
Rights of Management (New York:
Columbia University Press,
1963), p. 18.
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many arbitrators absolve themselves of the influences of
personal values and attitudes in their arbitral decision
making.
A second recommendation of this researcher con
cerns the relationship of the work place and the issues
involved.

Arbitration cases are normally reported accord

ing to the issue involved, such as:
union security, picketing, etc.

management rights,

Classification of cases

according to industry and job type may yield valuable
information for management and labor in the form of identi
fying troublesome work areas.

Perhaps the arbitrator is

more or less sympathetic toward a particular work group
or work place.
A third recommendation involves a determination
of the rate at which labor arbitrators are "infusing”
dominant social values into the work place.

For example,

a firm may be marginal and may be dependent upon increased
economic efficiency for survival.

Does the arbitrator con

sider these factors when deciding a case concerning out-of
unit transfers of work?

Are there factors less important

to the firm that is in a more competitive position?
A fourth recommendation flows rather naturally
out of this study.

As the attitudes and values of labor

arbitrators are identified they should be compared to the
actual decisions as reported by the arbitrators.

In this

manner, hopefully, the gap between values and decisions
may be bridged.
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A more specific recommendation is that the
parties, as well as the labor arbitrators, begin to pub
lish the significant labor arbitration cases to a greater
extent than the present 4 percent.

This would be of

interest to all involved, management, labor, arbitrators,
and researchers.
A final avenue of additional research is the
use of hypothetical arbitration cases to compare value
orientations with the hypothetical arbitral decisions.
This approach would involve very little risk to established
labor arbitrators and would be of value in the selection
of individuals as future labor arbitrators.
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Lo

uisiana

state

u n iv er sity

AND AGRICULTURAL AND M E C H A N IC A L COLLEGE

199

B A T O N R O U G E • L O U I S I A N A • 70803
College o f Business A d m in is tra tio n
D EPARTM ENT OF M ANAGEM ENT

February 28, 1974

Dear Mr. Arbitrator:
Is there a difference in whether a professional
labor arbitrator is a lawyer-arbitrator or an economistarbitrator, or trained in some other discipline? Whether
he has little or a great deal of labor arbitration experi
ence? Whether he lives in the South or in the North, East
or West? Or could it be that even with their wide diver
sity of backgrounds and experiences, professional labor
arbitrators actually have similar impressions of certain
concepts related to industrial relations?
I am attempting to answer these types of questions
for my doctoral dissertation research in Management and
Economics at Louisiana State University and I need your
help.
The completion of this project depends upon your
responding to the enclosed questionnaire which is designed
to provide data for my research.
Will you please take
fifteen minutes of your time to complete the questionnaire
and return it to me in the stamped envelope?
I will be
happy to share the results with you upon request.
My analysis of the data will be aggregate and
strictly statistical in nature, thus insuring your anonymity.
I assure you that the data and its origin will remain confi
dential.
With your help I will be able to bring my doctoral
studies to a successful conclusion.
Your prompt reply will
certainly be appreciated.
Respectfully,

Ed W. Bankston
E W B :jb
Enclosures

(3)

Lo

St a t e

uisiana

u n iv er sity

AND AORICULTURAL AND M E C H A N IC A L COLLEGE

B A T O N R O U G E . L O U I S I A N A • 70803
T he Law School

February 18, 1974

Dear Fellow Arbitrator:
Further understanding of the labor arbitration
process and our roles as practitioners is the purpose of
a dissertation research project now under way by Mr. Ed W.
Bankston, doctoral candidate at L.S.U.
As each of us is concerned with the development,
promotion and future success of labor arbitration it is in
our interest to expand present knowledge of arbitration.
The knowledge generated by this research should be a use
ful contribution to the literature.
It is my opinion that this is a worthwhile en
deavor and I hope that you will assist Mr. Bankston by
providing the data requested.
Sincerely

dOuJL'H*-

Paul M. Hebert
Dean

200

Lo

uisiana

St a t e

U

niversity

AND AGRICULTURAL AND ME CH A NI CA L COL LEG E

B A T O N R O U G E • L O U I S I A N A • 70803
College o f Business A d m in is tra tio n
DEPARTM ENT OF M AN AG EM EN T

March 18, 1974

Dear Mr. Arbitrator:
Recently I mailed you a questionnaire asking for
your help in completing a study of labor arbitrators.
Initial response has been very encouraging; and if you
have already returned the questionnaire, please consider
this letter a personal "Thank you" for your time, effort,
and especially your interest.
If you have not had a chance
the questionnaire, would you please do
pation is vital to the success of this
the number of labor arbitrators is not
each individual response becomes quite
statistical standpoint.

as yet to return
so as your partici
study.
As you know,
large, therefore,
important from a

This study can be meaningful to labor arbitration
but only through your active support.
Won't you help me?

Ed W. Bankston
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INSTRUCTIONS
The purpose of this questionnaire is to obtain your
impressions of a variety of things or ideas.
For exam
ple, following this paragraph is the word BUREAUCRACY.
You are to give your impression of what this means to
you by placing an X on each of a series of scales which
appear beneath it on the same page.
Each scale is
defined by a pair of words.
(See the example below.)
Place an X on each scale in one of the seven spaces which
to you most accurately describes the particular thing or
idea.
On each page you will find a different concept to
be judged and beneath it a set of scales.
The following
illustrate how you might mark the scales for a particular
thing or idea.
BUREAUCRACY
large

: X

:____ :____ :____ :_____

flexible ____ :____ :____ :____ :_____:

: small

X r____ : rigid

Please, place an X on every scale.
You are encouraged to work carefully, but at a fairly high
rate of speed.
Do not be puzzled over individual items;
it is your first impression that is important.
Make each
item a separate and independent judgment.
The concluding pages of the questionnaire are designed to
obtain some extremely important data.
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Please mark the series of descriptive scales according to
what the following concept means to you.

"WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS"
Bad .
Weak .
Unsuccessful .

. Good
^

Strong
Successful

Unfair .

. Fair

Narrow .

. Wide

Unimportant .

. Important

Rigid .

. Flexible

Worthless .

. Valuable

Severe .

. Lenient

Rugged .

. Delicate
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Please mark the series of descriptive scales according to
wh a t the following concept means to you.

"THE LABOR MOVEMENT"
Bad
Weak
Unsuccessful

Good
. Strong
. Successful

Unfair

. Fair

Narrow

. Wide

Unimportant

. Important

Rigid

. Flexible

Worthless

. Valuable

Severe

. Lenient

Rugged

. Delicate
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Please mark the series of descriptive scales according to
what the following concept means to you.

"RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS"
Bad .
Weak .
Unsuccessful .

. Good
. Strong
. Successful

Unfair .

. Fair

Narrow .

. Wide

Unimportant .

. Important

Rigid .

. Flexible

Worthless .

Valuable

Severe .

. Lenient

Rugged .

. Delicate

I
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Please mark the series of descriptive scales according to
what the following concept means to you.

"COMPULSORY ARBITRATION"
(Private Sector)

Bad .
Weak .
Unsuccessful .

. Good
. Strong
. Successful

Unfair _j_

. Fair

Narrow

. Wide

Unimportant .
Rigid .
Worthless

. Important
. Flexible
. Valuable

Severe .

. Lenient

Rugged .

. Delicate
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Please mark the series of descriptive scales according to
what the following concept means to you.

"UNION LEADERSHIP"
Bad .
Weak .
Unsuccessful

.

. Good
. Strong
. Successful

Unfair .

. Fair

Narrow .

. Wide

Unimportant .
Rigid .
Worthless

.

. Important
. Flexible
. Valuable

Severe .

. Lenient

Rugged .

. Delicate

Please mark the series of descriptive scales according to
what the following concept means to you.

"ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY"
Bad .____ .
Weak .____
Unsuccessful _.____

.

.

.

.

.

. Good
. Strong
. Successful

____

. Fair

Narrow .____

. Wide

Unfair

V

Unimportant

____

Rigid _.____

. Important
. Flexible

Worthless

____

. Valuable

Severe

____

. Lenient

Rugged _.____

. Delicate
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Please mark the series of descriptive scales according to
what the following concept means to you.

"MANAGEMENT RIGHTS"

Bad .
Weak .
Unsuccessful

.

. Good
. Strong
. Successful

Unfair .

. Fair

Narrow .

. Wide

Unimportant
Rigid
Worthless

.

. Important

__

. Flexible

.

. Valuable

Severe

. Lenient

Rugged .

. Delicate

21 0

Please mark the series of descriptive scales according to
what the following concept means to you.

"UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL
DECISION-MAKING AREAS"
Bad .
Weak .
Unsuccessful .

. Good
. Strong
. Successful

Unfair .

. Fair

Narrow

. Wide

Unimportant

. Important

Rigid .

. Flexible

Worthless .

. Valuable

Severe .

. Lenient

Rugged .

. Delicate
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To help me with the statistical analysis of the data,
please give the following information about yourself.

1.

Your age (check o n e ) :
less than 35
35 - 39
40 - 44
45 - 49
50 - 54
55 - 59
________ 60 - 64
65 or more

2.

How many total years of formal education did you
complete, including school, university, and technical
school?

3.

If you attended a university or a technical school,
what was the speciality you studied? (Check o n e ) :
________ Law
________ Economics
________ Business or Labor Relations
________ Other (please specify)

4.

How many years have you been a labor arbitrator?
(Check o n e ) :
________ less than 3 years
________ 3 to 5 years
________ 5 to 10 years
________ 10 to 20 years
________ 20 to 30 years
________ 30 to 40 years
________ more than 40 years

5.

Would you classify yourself as a "full-time" or "parttime" labor arbitrator?
________ Full-time
Part-time
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6.

How many labor arbitration decisions have you rendered?
(Check one) :
_______ less than 10
11 to 20
_______ 21 to 50
51 to 100
1 0 1 to 20 0
_______ 201 to 500
more than 500

7..

From a geographical standpoint, are most of your arbi
tration cases
_______ Local
_______ Regional
National

8.

Have you ever been employed by the U.S. Dept, of Labor,
the NLRB, WLB, or other government agency whose primary
concern involved the labor sector?
Yes — which agency
No

9.

Have you ever held a management position in a firm?
_______ Yes
No

10.

Have you ever been a member of a labor union?
_______ Yes
No

11.

Would you classify your father's attitudes as:
_______ Pro-Management
_______ Neutral
Pro-Labor

12.

Your state of residence: __________________
For a copy of the results, please furnish:
Name
_____________________________________
Address _____________________________________
Title

APPENDIX B
STATISTICAL TABLES FOR ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
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Analysis of Variance for Age, Degree, Expy, Time,
Expn, Fed, Mang, Labor, Res, and NAA, by
Type of Concept, and Interactions

Source
Regression
Age
Type
Age * Type
Error

Regression
Degree
Type
Degree * Type
Error

Regression
Expy
Type
Expy * Type
Error

Regression
Time
Type
Time * Type
Error

Regression
Expn
Type
Expn * Type
Error

d.f.

8
2
2

4
445

8
2
2

4
445

8
2
2

4
445

8
2
2

4
445

8
2
2

4
445

**Level of Significance = .01

s. s.

m. s.

F-ratio

89.18

11.14

0.21

0 .10

87.07

43.52
0.47
0.35

31.31**
0.30
122.29**
1.32

1.88

158.42

12.19

36.67**
4.95**
129.60**
6.07**

98.34
3.32
86.92
8.14
149.22

43.46
2.07
0.33

90.39
1.18
87.17
2.03
157.22

11.29
0.59
43.58
0.50
0.35

31.97**
1.67
123.37**
1.43

87.20
0.03
87.10
0.06
160.41

10.90
43.55

30.23**
0.04
120.81**
0.04

89.08
0.49
87.12
1.46
158.52

11.13
0.24
43.56
0.73
0.35

1.66

0.01
0.01

0.36

31.25**
0.69
122.28**
1.02
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Source
Regression
Fed
Type
Fed * Type
Error

Regression
Mang
Type
Mang * Type
Error

Regression
Labor
Type
Labor * Type
Error

Regression
Res
Type
Res * Type
Error

Regression
NAA
Type
NAA * Type
Error

d.f.
5
1
2
2

448

5
1
2
2

448

5
1
2
2

448

11

3
2
6

436

5
1
2
2

448

*Level of Significance = .05
**Level of Significance = .01

s. s.

m.s.

F-ratio

97.91
4.98
86.89
6.04
149.70

19.58
4.98
43.45
3.02
0.33

58.60**
14.91**
130.01**
9.03**

89.67
1.57
87.12
0.98
157.93

17.93
1.57
43.56
0.49
0.35

50.87**
4.45*
123.57**
1.39

88.83
0.08
87.09
1.65
158.77

17.76
0.08
43.54
0.82
0.35

50.13**
0.23
122.87**
2.33

8.27

23.79**
3.23*
120.34**
1.89

91.04
3. 37
83.71
3.94
151.65

41.85
0.65
0.34

92.08
0.36
87.04
4.66
155.53

18.41
0.36
43.52
2.33
0.34

1.12

53.04**
1.05
125.36**
6.72**
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Analysis of Variance for Variables: WE, WP, LE, LP,
RE, RP, CE, CP, UE, UP, EE, EP, ME, MP, PE, and PP
As Functions of Age, Degree, Expy, Time,
Expn, Fed, Mang, Labor, Res, and NAA
"WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS"
(Evaluative Scales)

Source
Regression
Age
Degree
Expy
Time
Expn
Fed
Mang
Labor
Res
NAA
Error

d.f.

s.s.

m.s.

18

17.00
1.91

0.94
0.95
0.06
0.35

2
2
2
1
2
1
1
1

0 .12

0.71
0.10

4.40
0.28
2.56
0 .00
0.66
0 .02

3
1
100

153.95

0 .10
2.20

0.28
2.56
0.00
0.22
0.0 2

F-ratio
0.61
0.62
0.04
2.31
0.06
1.42
0.18
1.66
0.00

0.14
0.01

1.39

"WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS"
(Potency Scales)

Source
Regression
Age
Degree
Expy
Time
Expn
Fed
Mang
Labor
Res
NAA
Error

d.f.
18
2
2
2
1
2
1
1
1

3
1
1 00

**Level of Significance = .01

F-ratio

s.s.

m.s.

12.75
0.19
0.18
2.30

0.70
0.09
0.09
1.15

1.08
0.14
0.14
1.76

0.00

0.0 0
0 .68

0.00

1.36
0.06
0.24
3.93
3.26
0.15
65.57

0.06
0.24
3.93
1.08
0.15
0.65

1.03
0.09
0.37
6 .0 0 **
1.65
0.62
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"THE LABOR MOVEMENT"
(Evaluative Scales)

Source
Regression
Age
Degree
Expy
Time
Expn
Fed
Mang
Labor
Res
NAA
Error

d.f.
18
2
2
2
1
2
1
1
1

3
1
100

s.s.

m. s .

5.60
0.16
1.62
0.34
0.55
0.64
0.53
0.08
1.13
0.23
0.03
40.30

0.31
0.08
0.81
0.17
0.55
0.32
0.53
0.08
1.13
0.07
0.03
0.40

F-ratio
0.77
0 .21
2 .01

0.43
1.36
0.79
1.32
0.20

2.82
0.19
0.09

"THE LABOR MOVEMENT"
(Potency Scales)

Source
Regression
Age
Degree
Expy
Time
Expn
Fed
Mang
Labor
Res
NAA
Error

d.f.

s.s.

m.s.

18

6.88

2
2
2
1
2
1
1
1

0.31

3

0.36
2.04
0.62
1.29
0.07
0.06
0.28

0.38
0.15
0.33
0.18
2.04
0.31
1.29
0.07
0 .0.6
0.09

1
100

0.12

0.12

29.78

0.29

*Level of Significance = .05
**Level of Significance = .01

0.66

F-ratio
1.28
0.53
1.12

0.61
6 .8 6 **

1.05
4.34*
0.24
0.22

0.32
0.43
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"RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS"
(Evaluative Scales)

Source
Regression
Age
Degree
Expy
Time
Expn
Fed
Mang
Labor
Res
NAA
Error

d.f.

s.s.

m.s.

F-ratio

3

78.62
2.84
10.80
1.91
7.67
0.56
13.92
1.94
0.43
7.78

4.36
1.42
5.40
0.95
7.67
0.28
13.92
1.94
0.43
2.59

2.45
0.79
3.03*
0.53
4.31*
0.15
7.82**
1.09
0.24
1.45

1
100

0.21

0.2 1

177.90

1.77

18
2
2
2
1
2
1
1
1

0.11

"RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS"
(Potency Scales)

Source
Regression
Age
Degree
Expy
Time
Expn
Fed
Mang
Labor
Res
NAA
Error

d.f.

s.s.

m.s.

F-ratio

18

26.70
0.51
6.82
2.49
1.48
1.39

1.48
0.25
3.41
1.24
1.48
0.69

1.84
0.31
4.24**
1.54
1.84

2
2
2
1
2
1
1
1

3
1
100

*Level of Significance = .05
**Level of Significance = .01

0.00

0.00

1.73
0.41
3.62
0.14
80.43

1.73
0.41
1.20

0.14
0.80

0.86
0.00

2.15
0.51
1.50
0.18
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"COMPULSORY ARBITRATION (Private Sector)"
(Evaluative Scales)

Source
Regression
Age
Degree
Expy
Time
Expn
Fed
Mang
Labor
Res
NAA
Error

d.f.

s.s.

m.s.

F-ratio

2
2
2
1
2
1
1
1

100.77
0.34
22.15
4.54
2.95
2.90
7.27
0.19
0.18

5.59
0.17
11.07
2.27
2.95
1.45
7.27
0.19
0.18

3.19^
0.09
6.32^
1.29

3

20.00

6 .66

3.36
175.24

3.36
1.75

18

1
100

1.68

0.82
4.15A
0 .11
0.10

3.80^
1.91

"COMPULSORY ARBITRATION (Private Sector)"
(Potency Scales)

Source
Regression
Age
Degree
Expy
Time
Expn
Fed
Mang
Labor
Res
NAA
Error

d.f.

s.s.

m.s.

F-ratio

18

28.42
1.11

7.65
3.85
0.16
0.54
1.63

1.57
0.55
3.82
1.92
0.16
0.27
1.63

2 .59^

2
2
2
1
2
1
1
1

0.01

0.01

2.41
2.34

2.41
0.78

0.01

0.01

60.85

0.60

3
1
10 0

♦Level of Significance = .05
♦♦Level of Significance = .01

0.91
6.29^
3.16^
0.26
0.44
2.69
0 .0 2
3.91*

1.28
0.03
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"UNION LEADERSHIP"
(Evaluative Scales)

Source
Regression
Age
Degree
Expy
Time
Expn
Fed
Mang
Labor
Res
NAA
Error

d.f.
18
2
2
2
1
2
1
1
1

3
1
100

s.s.

m.s.

10.60
0.16
1.30

0.58
0.08
0.65

0.17
1.33

0.02
0.01

0.01
0.01

0.0 2
0.0 2

0.73

0.36

0.86
2.11

0.86
2.11

0.45
3.31
0.48
48.99

0.45

0.75
1.76
4.32*
0.92
2.25
0.98

1.10

0.48
0.48

F-ratio

1 .20

"UNION LEADERSHIP"
(Potency Scales)

Source
Regression
Age
Degree
Expy
Time
Expn
Fed
Mang
Labor
Res
NAA
Error

d.f.

s.s.

m.s.

18

7.33
0.97
0.69
0.60
0.70
0.29
0.78

0.40
0.48
0.34
0.30
0.70
0.14
0.78

0.02

0.02

2
2
2
1
2
1
1
1

3
1
100

*Level of Significance = .05

0.53
0.34
0.39
42.12

0.53
0.11

0.39
0.42

F-ratio
0.96
1.15
0.82
0.71
1.67
0.35
1.85
0.06
1.26
0.27
0.93
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"ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY"
(Evaluative Scales)

Source
Regression
Age
Deg
Expy
Time
Expn
Fed
Mang
Labor
Res
NAA
Error

d.f.

s.s.

m.s.

F-ratio

18

16.22

2
2
2
1
2
1
1
1

0 .10

0.90
0.05

1.27
0.07
3.15*
1.69
0.54
0.34
0.55
7.02**
1.17
0.38

3
1
100

4.44
2.39
0.38
0.48
0.38
4.95
0.82
0.80
0.16
70.55

2.22

1.19
0.38
0.24
0.38
4.95
0.82
0.26
0.16
0.70

0.22

"ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY"
(Potency Scales)

Source
Regression
Age
Deg
Expy
Time
Expn
Fed
Mang
Labor
Res
NAA
Error

d.f.

s.s.

m.s.

18

7.36
1.29
1.42
1.59

0.40
0.64
0.71
0.79

2
2
2
1
2
1
1
1

3
1
1 00

*Level of Significance = .05
**Level of Significance = .01

0.02

0.0 2

1.27
0.14
3.17
0.04
1.97
0.17
42.45

0.63
0.14
3.17
0.04
0.65
0.17
0.42

F-ratio
0.96
1.52
1.68

1.87
0.05
1.50
0.34
7.48**
0.09
1.55
0.40
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"MANAGEMENT RIGHTS"
(Evaluative Scales)

Source
Regression
Age
Degree
Expy
Time
Expn
Fed
Mang
Labor
Res
NAA
Error

d.f.

s.s.

m.s.

F-ratio

18

40.65
2.87
1.71
0.51

2.25
1.43
0.85
0.25

2.65**
1.68
1.00

0.01

0.01

0.02

2.17
3.13
2.81
0.39
11.84
0.32
85.45

1.08
3.13
2.81
0.39
3.94
0.32
0.85

1.27
3.66*
3.28
0.45
4.61**
0.37

s .s .

m. s .

F-ratio

14.39
1.13
0.96
1.52

0.79
0.56
0.48
0.76

1.23
0.87
0.74
1.17

0.00

0.00
0.0 2

0.00

2
2
2
1
2
1
1
1

3
1
100

0.30

"MANAGEMENT RIGHTS"
(Potency Scales)

Source
Regression
Age
Degree
Expy
Time
Expn
Fed
Mang
Labor
Res
NAA
Error

d.f.
18
2
2
2
1
2
1
1
1

3
1
100

*Level of Significance = .05
**Level of Significance - .01

0.05
0.58
0.44
0.06
3.75
0.92
64.86

0.58
0.44
0.06
1.25
0.92
0.64

0.04
0.90
0.67
0.10

1.92
1.42
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"UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL
DECISION-MAKING AREAS"
(Evaluative Scales)

Source
Regression
Age
Degree
Expy
Time
Expn
Fed
Mang
Labor
Res
NAA
Error

d.f.

s.s.

m.s.

F-ratio

18

23.58
5.76
7.73
0.19

1.31

1.62
3.58*
4.81**

2
2
2
1
2
1
1
1

3
1
100

2 .8 8

3.86
0.09

0.0 0

0.00
0.68

1.36
0.35
1.70
0.71
0.25
1.06
80.40

0.35
1.70
0.71
0.08
1.06
0.80

0.1 2
0 .0 0

0.84
0.44
2 .1 2
0 .88
0.1 0

1.32

"UNION PENETRATION OF MANAGERIAL
DECISION-MAKING AREAS"
(Potency Scales)

Source
Regression
Age
Degree
Expy
Time
Expn
Fed
Mang
Labor
Res
NAA
Error

d.f.
18
2
2
2
1
2
1
1
1

3
1
100

*Level of Significance = .05
**Level of Significance = .01

s. s.

m. s.

F-ratio

10.58
1.97
1.53
0.61
0.50
0.87
0.38
0.07
0.13
0.73
2.07
31.72

0.58
0.98
0.76
0.30
0.50
0.43
0.38
0.07
0.13
0.24
2.07
0.31

1.85
3.10*
2.42
0.97
1.60
1.38

.

1.21

0.23
0.43
0.77
6.54**
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